Once again, if you're interested in the Winograd report, you should read it yourself. But for those who can't or won't, here is the short version (the long version is 617 pages long):

The first crucial decision made by the panel is that not only would they offer no recommendations regarding individuals, they would not even offer conclusions regarding individuals. So zealous were they in this regard that they do not mention names in the entire report. A reader from Mars could read this report and not know the name of Israel's Prime Minister. They spent an entire chapter explaining why they took this route. In brief, they wished to take the high route, which is how they understood their mandate; they didn't want to waste time dealing with the legal implications; and, most interestingly, they didn't want future Prime Ministers to hesitate to make difficult decisions for fear of commissions' nasty reports (Ch.3, para. 12). They are careful to note, though, that they did reach conclusions regarding individuals in the intermediate report and that they stand by those conclusions.

This approach colors the whole report. However, there is a single code word that they use when they wish to say that somebody screwed up so bad that something ought to be done. That word is "keshel" (failure). They go to some length to distinguish "failure" from simple bad judgment (Ch. 17, para. 25).

And there are failures galore. Many of the failures were at the military level. However, other than a few especially frightening items in that regard that I'll mention below, I will focus here on the political failures.

The central political failure from which almost all the others follow is the government's inability to decide what kind of campaign it wished to run. They faced a choice between two plausible possibilities: a quick and decisive air attack followed by withdrawal or a full-scale war necessitating the use of ground forces. Unable to act decisively, they chose neither and found themselves in a protracted war without ready ground troops and with time working against Israel's interests. (Ch. 16, para. 25; Ch. 17, para. 22, 131). The failure to call up reserves early in the campaign was another failure attributable to indecision and lack of overall strategic thinking (Ch. 17, para. 24; Ch. 16, para. 51). The fact that there was no orderly discussion of any of these issues within the government and between the military and the government is a third failure (Ch. 17, para. 28). This indecision and strategic shallowness led to management of the war lacking in the necessary resolve (Ch. 16, para. 97). All these failures are the responsibility of the heads of the political echelons (Ch. 17, para. 32, 126, 133, 138, 139), which lacked the necessary experience (Ch. 16, para. 101).

A great deal of the report deals with the decision to use ground troops in bloody battles just prior to the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 that ended hostilities. The panel concludes that the decision to go ahead with the battles was belated (Ch. 16, para. 66) but not unreasonable under the circumstances (Ch. 17, para. 103). The main problem was the almost complete chaos in those battles involving a complete breakdown of military discipline in a number of battles (Ch. 16, para. 84).

Among the military failures that are especially alarming was the lack of confidence of some commanders in soldiers in their command and, more significantly, in their commanding officers (Ch. 17, para. 56) that led to insubordination (this is hinted at in the report but not spelled out; there's probably more detail in the secret report). Some commanders lacked the necessary commitment to victory and displayed an inclination to just try to get by (Ch. 17, para. 66).

Of particular interest is the list of "kontzeptziot" (ideological prejudices) that colored strategic thinking for the worse (Ch. 16, para. 99). These include: a habit for protracted "low-intensity" conflicts; the notion that conventional conceptions of battle and victory are passe; over-confidence in the ability to decide wars from the air; over-tolerance for suffering of the home front; assigning great weight to military casualties; an almost mystical fear of conquest and "quagmire".

One major failure was the complete lack of coordination between diplomatic efforts to end the war and military efforts to win the war, especially among those in the Foreign Ministry (Ch. 16, para. 62; Ch. 17, para. 73, 91). The Foreign Ministry also failed to coordinate "hasbara" efforts (Ch. 17, para. 94). In general, the panel felt it did not have time to fully investigate the Foreign Ministry's performance and recommends that this be undertaken (Ch. 17, para. 93).

Finally, the panel notes that it does not believe that the lessons of the war have already been internalized by the political or military echelons (Ch. 18, para. 33).

In short, don't let the press or government spokesmen spin you. This report is high-minded and consequently short on name-calling and finger-pointing. But this should not be mistaken for being any less damning. The gun is on the table for any of the "failures" with enough integrity and intelligence to know what to do with it.