I have posted a few times about my recently resolved din torah. My lawyer during that ordeal was Ed Rubin z"l. Ed and I would get together whenever he was in Israel or I was in the States, ostensibly to discuss the case. We'd invariably discuss the case for about three minutes and then spend hours chatting about Israeli politics, the heimish Upper West Side scene, Rebbishe politics (he was a Rubin and a Halberstam, Rebbishe yichus on both sides, and lawyer for his wayward cousins), all topics with which he was intimately familiar and had insightful opinions. He was a tenacious lawyer, but always fought with integrity.

Ed passed away suddenly a few weeks ago at the way-too-young age of 57. Our relationship began as lawyer-client, but ended as a friendship. I will miss him.

I was off in the U.S. so am a bit late weighing in on The Speech and other developments. A few too brief comments.

1. I liked Bibi's speech, though it was only a start. The fundamental asymmetry in all Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is that the Palestinians make concrete demands (territory) backed by threats (terror). Israel simply resists but makes no demands and no threats. Thus, for a diplomat, the only game in town is wearing Israel down. Netanyahu has at least made some concrete demands: that the Palestinians agree to demilitarization and to recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. It doesn't matter that these demands are inadequate and unenforceable. All that matters is that the Palestinians will never agree to them. Eventually, Netanyahu will need to follow up with the threat: what Israel will do to make the world miserable so long as the Palestinians do not agree to these minimal demands.

2. There are a number of indications that power in Israel is shifting rightward. The judicial appointments committee now tilts slightly rightward. The leftist political appointments in the broadcast commission have all resigned. In court hearings on illegal building in Yesha, the State has finally defended its delay in destroying houses on the same grounds it has succesfully used to justify delays in destroying illegal Arab building, namely, the State's perogative to establish priorities. To be sure, none of these matter much. Due to Gideon Saar's amendment to the judicial appointments law, seven votes are needed to get a Supreme Court justice appointed, so even under ideal conditions the three justices on the committee have veto power (not to mention that Yacov Ne'eman can be counted on not to ruffle Beinish's feathers). Likewise, nobody watches Channel 1, anyway. And the Court has not yet accepted the State's argument with regard to demolitions. The point, however, is that since so many Israel makhers are short on conviction and long on getting along with what they believe is the center of power, we can very quickly reach a tipping point.

3. Obama only seems to be one step behind the curve on Iran. His comment that Moussawi is not very different than Ahmadinejad would have been apt had Moussawi won. Under the circumstances, however, the issue is the whole regime, not Moussawi. Obama's subsequent attempt to "take a stand" by addressing the protesters' right of assembly again falls short; the issue is the very nature of this oppressive regime, not the way it handles protests. But, in fact, what seems to be flat-footedness is actually moral relativism. Obama and the rest of the Best and Brightest simply don't deign to take sides on the substance. There are no good guys and bad guys in their world, only rules of engagement.

Amidst all the mindless chatter about Obama's rhetoric, the only important line in the whole speech has been missed. Forget the even-handed bromides. Forget the offensive equation of the Holocaust with Palestinian suffering. Forget the unhappy fact that Obama has essentially become a salesman for the Geneva "accords". The one line in the speech that should cause every Israeli to lose sleep is this:

"I understand those who protest that some countries have weapons that others do not. No single nation should pick and choose which nations hold nuclear weapons. That is why I strongly reaffirmed America's commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons. And any nation – including Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That commitment is at the core of the Treaty, and it must be kept for all who fully abide by it. And I am hopeful that all countries in the region can share in this goal."

What he is saying here is that a) he will allow Iran to develop nuclear power (which in their case is only a few weeks different than developing nuclear weapons) and b) he will demand that Israel sign the NPT.

(Article VI of the NPT reads as follows:
"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.")

In short, it looks like on the nuclear weapons issue, he's not going after Iran, a signatory state of the NPT, even if a mendacious one. He's coming after us.

If you don't believe that chutzpah has no limits, read the editorial by Bernie Marcus, founder of Home Depot, in the WSJ today.

Among other gems, Marcus writes:

Will President Barack Obama and the Senate show a strong commitment to the rule of law in selecting and confirming a Supreme Court Justice? On multiple occasions -- from his floor statement on his vote against Chief Justice John Roberts to his announcement of Justice Souter's retirement -- the president has reiterated that it is appropriate to select judges who will decide cases based on "empathy" -- that is to say, personal experiences, feelings and political views.

Such a standard ignores a judge's legitimate role as neutral umpire who rules on the basis of what the law is rather than what he thinks it should be....

The Senate must have a full and fair hearing of the president's nominee as a first step toward ensuring our legal system continues to support a key pillar of the free market -- the fair administration of justice for all.

Sounds sensible, right? Here's the catch. As readers of this blog well know, the "legitimate role" of which Marcus speaks is exactly the one that the Israeli Supreme Court systematically oversteps. And the "full and fair hearings" which Marcus calls for are non-existent in Israel. And the greatest champion of this corrupt system is the Israel Democracy Institute, which has run a multi-million dollar campaign to enshrine the current situation in an essentially irrevocable constitution.

And this campaign has been funded by (drum roll)... Bernie Marcus.

Apparently, you don't need a conscience to move hardware.

It turns out that it is possible to wax nostalgic for kitsch. Four years ago, I described Yom Haatzmaut in My Little Town, as follows:

... every Yom HaAtzmaut I awaken to the startling realization that I now live in Mayberry. Or, if I might phrase it a bit less delicately, in Israel we are the goyim. Yes, in My Little Town people actually gather in the main drag for a display of schoolkids doing funny waving stuff with flags, the mayor bashfully reads all the right cliches, youthful entrepeneurs sell cotton candy, and it's all topped off with, you guessed it, a dazzling display of fireworks.

That was then. In what I sincerely hope is not a metaphor for some more profound shift in the cosmic order, this year's celebration of Yom Haatzmaut in My Little Town was a quasi-professional "production" involving two loud, obnoxious and unctuous "presenters" of the sort once confined to game-show hosting. Somebody had the bright idea that some tenth-rate hired guns would lend the proceedings a more polished feel. Another innovation was that the usually very affecting brief autobiographical statements read by the lighters of the torches were pre-recorded; the result was less so much affecting as reminiscent of Bob Eubanks' descriptions of the contestants on The Dating Game.

If even My Little Town has to fob Yom Haatzmaut off on a producer, big trouble is brewing. I'm hankering for Andy and Opie.

The Jew-hatred festival in Geneva is wonderfully symbolic not only for convening on Yom Hashoah. It brings together self-styled potentates from loser countries and snobs trading on the past glories of fallen empires. They both hate the Jews for essentially the same reason.

Jews are upwardly mobile.

This simple fact violates the vital lie by which each of these groups lives. The losers would like to believe that their fate is determined by forces outside their control. The heirs to privilege would like to believe that such privilege is pre-ordained and non-contingent. The notion of pulling yourself up, as exemplified by Jews, is threatening.

(And that's why nations that still believe in merit [USA] or have recently discovered the idea [some of the Eastern European countries that are making progress] are now our friends.)

I kept my promise to myself not to blog coalition negotiations until they ended. Everything out there during the negotiating period is disinformation, so the less one discusses it the better.

So what have we got? Some things were completely predictable from the start.

Bibi was not going to live for one moment with a narrow coalition. He did not want to function under threat from every unhappy MK, a fair number of whom sit in his own party. Also, he wanted to make his life easier by having some lefties in his government. This keeps some of the press off his back and coopts some of those who'd otherwise be undermining him. (As LBJ said about J. Edgar Hoover, it's probably better to have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in.)

What was not inevitable is the choice of Labor over Kadima. In the end, it is only Livni's inflated ego that kept Kadima out. I predict that it will become increasingly evident that Livni is psycho and she will cause Kadima to self-destruct. In any event, Netanyahu's courting of Barak is worrisome. Several people in a position to know have recently stated publicly what many observers have suspected for a long time: Barak has completely lost his nerve and opposes any assertive action. Not good qualities for a Defense Minister. Some have argued that Bibi can live with Barak as DM because the only issue on the table now is Iran and they are in agreement on the issue. I suspect that if this is indeed the case, the point of agreement is to do nothing.

Another entirely predictable outcome is Mafdal in, Ichud Leumi out. Mafdal is built to be in. They'd have gone in even if Bibi had offered them only chairmanship of the Dead Poets Society, so in fact they got a pretty good deal. Ichud Leumi was never going to sit in the coalition. First, because Bibi didn't want them (he regards them as unreliable and weird) and, second, because they don't really want to be in the government (they're not built to make decisions, but rather to protest other people's decisions).

The great mystery of the next Knesset is Yisrael Beiteinu. On the one hand, Lieberman seems to grasp what Livni does not, namely, that we need to shift the onus of negotiations with our enemies to the question of what they will give us, not what we will give them. On the other hand, as one MK very familiar with Lieberman told me, within two months Lieberman will have an envoy in charge of talking to Hamas and he'll be singing the "ma shero'im mikan" song. His alleged intention to appoint his co-conspirator in Martin Schlaff related criminal activity, Dov Weissglas, as a special envoy does not bode well.

As for this government's domestic agenda, don't expect much. The coalition agreement with Yisrael Beiteinu is the key document, since the later agreements by and large reflect what is written there. First, on civil marriage, they pretty much caved. They now limit their demands for civil marriage to two people of no religion. Very lame. On easing conditions for conversion, it seems that yesterday's agreement with Yahadut Hatorah pretty much kills any significant change. Sofa Landver, newly-appointed Absorption Minister, is bad news and will try to facilitate immigration of as many Russian goyim as possible, but is unlikely to have much impact.

On systemic reform, all the talk of changing the system fundamentally is pretty much moot for now. (It was agreed to establish a committee to study the matter, which is coalition-speak for DOA.) What is left, and apparently will get done (see starting from para. 28 in the YB coalition agreement), is the following:
1. The budget will be bi-annual so that the threat of the government falling as a result of failure to pass the budget is essentially limited to once per term.
2. A Knesset vote to dissolve the Knesset will require more than 61 votes in favor. The coalition agreement calls for 65, but it appears that the number will probably be upped to 70 (as per the transition document prepared by Shteinitz's committee).
3. Right now the law on no-confidence motions is that an alternative government must be proposed and if the proposed alternative fails to get support of the Knesset, the Knesset is dissolved. The new law will be that in such a case the old government will continue as if nothing happened.

The first of these is a good idea. The second less so, but not tragic. The third will quickly become an example of the law of unintended consequences. The idea is to increase stability by making dissolution of the Knesset more difficult. In fact, however, it will have the opposite effect. One reason that no-confidence motions are infrequent is the fear of dissolution of the Knesset, something MKs generally do not want. The elimination of that threat will make frivolous no-confidence motions more frequent. Dumb.

As for the constitution, judicial reform and all that, forget about it. Justice Minister Yaakov Ne'eman has been badly burned by the Ministry in the past, but (or, more precisely, therefore) he is not bucking for a fight. There is a good reason that the self-Righteous Brothers (Benny Begin and Dan Meridor) fought tooth and nail against Friedmann's reappointment but support Ne'eman's candidacy. (See my post on the differences between Ne'eman's positively horrendous proposed Basic Law: Legislation and Friedmann's proposal.)

Dudu Rotem will be head of vaadat hukah and he is completely unpredictable. He has no interest in a constitution, which is fine. He is crazy in the right direction, but he has somewhat idiosyncratic views on what is important and what is not important. Conveniently, all the big shots are ministers so the committees will be staffed by back-benchers, who -- perhaps less fettered by conventional wisdom -- might do some interesting things under the radar. It's very likely that Tzipi Hotovely (that's the correct spelling) and Yariv Levine -- both people with the right ideas -- will be in vaadat hukah, so some progress is possible.

Shoot me for saying this, but the whole birchas hachamah thing bores me. I mean, it stands to reason that a berachah that shows up once every 28 years would attract some attention. But that doesn’t justify two lines of gemara and half a se’if in Shulchan Aruch getting book-length treatments. With that degree of bloviation a lot of nonsense is bound to be said.

Here is the short version. The gemara (Berachot 59b) cites a beraisa that when one sees the sun, the moon, the planets and the constellations at some (unspecified) special point in their respective cycles, one should recite the brachah “oseh [maaseh] bereishis”. Abaye explains that with regard to the sun, the reference is to the point once every 28 years when the vernal equinox is on Tuesday evening (i.e., the beginning of what we call “yom revi’i").

If not for Abaye, one could have taken the reference to be to the annual vernal equinox. But let’s work with Abaye. The simplest explanation of his remark is that, since as a matter of convention a solar year is defined as 365¼ days, any given point during the year will fall out on the same day and hour every 28 years. (28 times 365¼ is divisible by 7 and no number smaller than 28 will do the trick.) This is true in particular for the vernal equinox – a distinguished astronomical point – and so we recite the berachah at the vernal equinox every 28 years. (Rashi frums it up a bit by tying the particular spot in the 28-year cycle to the original point of creation, a flourish not mentioned by the gemara or, subsequently, the Rambam. Why modern (?) commentators insist on seizing upon this flourish as the starting point for the discussion is a mystery to me. Whatever.)

By this account, the 365¼-day year is merely a convention, a sort of canonical approximation. There’s nothing to see out there every 28 years. And this shouldn’t bother anyone. After all, by all accounts, the 28-year number is crucially dependent on the seven-day week, which itself is merely a convention. And Hazal point out that our holidays are defined by decisions of the beis din, not by astronomical events (“eileh moadei hashem asher tikreu osam” – al tikri osam ela atem). In halacha, astronomical events are anchors that prevent unlimited calendrical drift, but they aren’t constitutive.

This approach has a certain post-modern cachet and neatly avoids commitment to (very very) bad astronomy. But still. You’ve got to wonder how people who know better – and many great rabbanim did and do know better – can mark a virtual vernal equinox 18½ days after the actual equinox (which is today, Friday, at 11:44 GMT).

I think the answer lies in the dual definition of equinox used by Hazal (and many others). The official (modern) definition of equinox is the (twice-a-year) moment when the line connecting the sun to Earth is perpendicular to the earth’s axis (the line from the South pole to the North pole). At that moment, the sun is moving east to west right along the equator.

But there’s another, closely related, definition that was more commonly used in the olden days and which is used by the Rambam: it is when the sun enters (the part of the celestial sphere identified with) the constellation Aries (taleh). The two definitions were once indistinguishable. But here’s the weird thing. The tropical year (the duration of one orbit of the earth around the sun) is a bit over 11 minutes short of 365¼ days, so that the vernal equinox by the standard definition is 18 days earlier than the virtual equinox Jews use. But the sidereal year (the time it takes for the sun to get back to the same spot relative to the constellations) is actually just over nine minutes longer than 365¼ days. And the definition of the part of the celestial sphere identified with Aries is a bit fuzzy. So while the virtual equinox has been visibly different than the actual equinox according to the standard definition going back to Amoraic times, the sun did continue to rise in Aries at the virtual equinox right up until about the year 1500. (The sun shifts relative to the constellations by about one degree every 70 years and each constellation is identified with 30 degrees worth of celestial sphere, so any point in the tropical year coincides with a given constellation for about 2000 years.) So by the sidereal definition of equinox, we were doing more or less okay for a while. By now, though, the actual (tropical) vernal equinox is well into Pisces and even our virtual equinox has slipped into Pisces. The sun actually enters Aries these days on April 15, a week after our virtual equinox. (Somebody tracks this because Indian astrologers use the sidereal cycle to do whatever it is Indian astrologers do. At least there are a few true believers left in this world.)

So in the end it’s all about the completion of a virtual cycle. That’s it. Move along, move along. Nothing to see here.

The other events mentioned in the same beraisa, the completion of some sort of cycles involving the moon, the planets and the constellations, have all gone the way of the dodo bird. Nobody seems to have lost any sleep over any of them. If you get my drift...

So the people didn't vote the way the Israel Democracy Institute thinks they should and suddenly electoral reform is all the rage.

There are a number of directions that reform can take and they need to be carefully distinguished. The one most often discussed is switching from proportional to first-past-the-post regional elections. I've already discussed that before. In short, the idea has some merit but plenty of risks. It's certainly not the most pressing reform.

Less discussed but simpler and more pressing is how the Knesset forms a government. One current favorite idea of the leftist elites is that the head of largest party should be named prime minister with no Knesset ratification necessary. Coincidentally, in the current situation that would make Tzipi Livni prime minister despite coalitional support approaching zero.

That fact alone should explain the abject stupidity of the idea but let me explain in broader terms. The effect of changes to a mechanism for coalition formation is not only at the last stage. The main effect is the one on the strategic considerations of the voter. When voters know that the largest part will get a huge bonus (in this case, its head becoming prime minister), they have a very big incentive to vote for a party that has a chance to be the biggest one. Such incentive for strategic voting already exists but the proposed change would exacerbate it. This would either destroy small parties (if their voters shift to the large parties) or it would turn them into spoiler parties (if their voters do not shift).

As it happens, I'm not a huge fan of small parties (they have a natural tendency to focus on narrow interests at the expense of broader ones), but it would be catastrophic, socially and politically, for them to be wiped out. Furthermore, if the voters for a given small party belong predominantly to a certain bloc, it would be a distortion of the voters' will for voters for that party to harm the chances of their preferred bloc to form the government. Supporters of this proposal understand full well that, since the right is divided fairly evenly among religious and secular parties, the proposal is advantageous for the left which is not inherently divided (except for the Arab parties).

From a purely objective point of view, the proposal also facilitates a situation in which the government and the Knesset are at complete loggerheads, potentially creating paralysis.

A much more reasonable proposal is that parties be allowed to form blocs prior to elections that would name a joint candidate for prime minister. All votes for any of those parties would then go towards the bloc's candidate for prime minister. The prime ministerial candidate of the largest bloc would automatically be named prime minister.

The strategic effect would be that, most likely, two blocs would result, since voters will only vote for a party in a bloc with a legitimate chance to be the largest one. The advantages of this method are manifold:
1. Voters for any party would know in advance where their party stood. This is simply more fair to voters.
2. The political power of the larger parties would increase since post-election horse-trading would be eliminated. It would also be harder for small parties to jump blocs after elections, having sold their voters on a particular they (For this advantage to be fully realized, the conditions under which a government could be brought down through no-confidence would need to be tightened a bit.)
3. The numerical power of small parties would remain stable, if not increase, since the incentive to jump to a large party is greatly diminished. (This point could make it a hard sell to the big parties, who might not be savvy enough to realize that point 2 is more important than point 3.)
4. Extremist parties that can't join any bloc would be severely weakened.
5. The chances of ending up with a prime minister who does not have broad Knesset support are small, since the government is guaranteed to have at least the support of the largest bloc. I concede that it is theoretically possible for there to be three blocs with the largest one having only 40-something seats, but this sounds like a stretch (and it wouldn't be as catastrophic as, say, 28 seats).

There's much more to say on this topic but I'd be happy to get comments on this teaser.

Once the soldiers' votes are counted, the messy calculations begin. If you want to know how the system of seat allocation works see my post on it from back in the previous election season.

Addendum: You can get more info in Hebrew on this wacky system here.
Note that the system favors large parties (or pairs of parties with remainder agreements), so Likud/YB are well-placed to benefit. In the past, parties have even picked up two seats as a result of the remainder calculations . (For example, Likud in 2003 went up from 36 to 38.)

Update (Thursday 12:00): The final tally not counting double-sealed ballots (soldiers, diplomats, patients and prisoners) has been posted here. Right now, Lieberman is teetering between 14 and 15 seats. Likud/YB will probably have to waste their first bonus from the remainders just to get that 15th seat secured. Unfortunately, once Lieberman's 15th phantom seat is accounted for, Kadima is closer to picking up an extra seat than Likud/Lieberman.

On the other hand, the soldiers' (et al.) votes are almost finished being counted and they are running in favor of Likud over Kadima (though, not by a huge margin) and Lieberman is very strong (though, less than Kadima).

The results of the exit polls have been announced and the situation is as follows. Kadima is projected to get about 30 seats and the Likud about 28 seats. Lieberman is in the area of 14-15 and Labor in the area of 13. Both Bayit Yehudi and Ichud Leumi seem to have gotten in, though barely. One of the two Arab parties might not get in. Overall, the right bloc is in the area of 63-64 seats.

So what will happen? First, the dry legal facts. the president must consult with the various parties and then make a determination which party has the best chance to form a coalition. That party gets the first chance to try. By all accounts, Likud has the best chance to form a coalition, but Peres is strongly tied to Kadima and might choose to give them the first shot.

So how will it play out? It's pretty straightforward. This is a bargaining game between Likud and Kadima. The most obvious coalition is one that includes both of them. The question is which gets to form the government and which joins it. The fact that Kadima is projected to be a bit larger (this is likely to change) seems like a key point in its favor, but in fact is not. The crucial issue in a bargaining game is the "disagreement point". The disagreement point is the result that ensues when the two sides fail to reach agreement. In this case, failing agreement, Likud has a plausible right-wing government, but Kadima has no plausible government. As a result, Likud has the upper hand in the negotiation with Kadima.

Several fine points should be noted. First of all, put yourself in Lieberman's position or in Shas's position. Given the fact that if Likud goes with Kadima, the negotiating position of these parties is reduced to close to zero, they have a very strong incentive to prefer a narrow government. This puts Likud in a strong position vis-a-vis them . For that reason, I predict that by tomorrow, we'll be seeing all these parties declaring their undying loyalty to a narrow Likud government. Second, from Likud's point of view, it would be better for Peres to give Kadima the first shot at forming a government. This is because once they fail to do so (and they will fail, if given the chance), Likud's advantage (the disagreement point) will be that much more clear to both sides. (Of course, if what you really want is a narrow right coalition, it might be better to just get on with it, but it's quite clear that that is not what Bibi wants. He wants only to wield the threat of such a government, not to realize the threat.)

One detail. As of now, Ichud Leumi has three seats. This might change once all the votes, including soldiers, are counted. If it holds, it means that Michael Ben-Ari is not in. While MBA and I share many views, the fact is that, fairly or not, there is just no chance of Ichud Leumi sitting in any coalition so long as he is in the faction. Without him, a narrow right coalition is that much more plausible.

A final note. One thing that held fairly constant in the polls for months was that Likud + Lieberman were worth 44 seats. Right now, they are projected at 42. My guess is that we'll see that number creep up to 44 as the real results come in. In fact, it is not unlikely that Likud will end up with more seats than Kadima.

Update (Wed. morning): A few brief observations. 1) It's hard to imagine anybody who voted for Kadima watching Livni's "victory" speech and not feeling buyer's remorse. 2) It seems that all of Kadima's surplus over what was expected came from Labor and Meretz. The tentative total of 44 for the three parties combined is what was anticipated. The Old Left is officially dead. (But voters on the left at least have the good sense to rally around the candidate with the best chance. If only the right had as much sense.) 3) Bibi will be the next Prime Minister and nobody knows it better than Peres. (The right has 65 and that number can only go up with the soldier votes and the remainder agreements.) That's why he'll work behind the scenes to engineer a deal that will give them equal power. It must be avoided. 4) The dumbest thing the right-wing parties can do is announce that they intend to drive a hard bargain with Bibi. The less likely a right-wing coalition is, the stronger Kadima is vis-a-vis Likud. We'll find out pretty quickly which of these parties is headed by a mathematician and which is headed by a Rov. 5) The next government will be Likud - Kadima - Lieberman - BY - one other dati party.

I've got time on my hands and really don't want to discuss elections. There'll be more than enough of that tomorrow.

In the last few years, the explosion of text available via the Internet has generated tons of research that can be applied to Torah. So far, very little of it has been exploited. Here is a short list of applications that are worth pursuing:

1. Using the Responsa Project as a base, for any given halachic topic, automatically construct a structured table consisting of the main sources relevant to the topic. Simple searches (as now done in the Responsa Project and similar searchable corpora) don't separate the main sources from those that mention a keyword in passing. They also don't find texts that are about the topic but don't use the query term. They also don't structure the results according to the interactions between sources. All this is doable provided that cross-references can be identified and properly exploited.

2. Given any anonymous Hebrew-Aramaic passage, use stylistic analysis to either identify the author (whether or not the passage is found in whatever corpus you're using) or to profile the author: what period did he live in, what region, who were his teachers.

3. Given multiple manuscripts of the same text, reconstruct the original text. This involves determining dependencies among the manuscripts and also using clever methods to determine the reliability of each manuscript even without knowing any ground truth against which to compare it.

4. Find a precise formal definition of kal ve-chomer that satisfactorily explains when it applies and when it does not.

5. Explicate the rabbinic theory of causality and indirect action. It should be able to explain when to apply the principle of grama benezikin patur as opposed to da-in dina de-garmi. Determine if the same theory is applicable to the laws of Shabbos.

6. Consider the set of all passages (loosely defined) in the Torah and determine the optimal clustering of the passages according to stylistic criteria. Measure the quality of the derived clusters to determine if they are sufficiently robust to qualify as organic units. (For the record, I don't see any theological issue here.)

If anybody is interested in any of these research problems, give me a shout and I'll go into greater detail.

What will the results look like on Tuesday night?

The pollsters will tell you that a lot depends on the undecideds. This is nonsense. The undecideds are almost all undecided only about which of two very similar parties to choose. The real unknown is how many votes each of the parties south of Labor will get.

The Likud-Lieberman bloc holds a lead of about six seats over the Kadima-Labor bloc, modulo certain assumptions about how the votes will distribute among the smaller parties. These assumptions are based on nothing with any statistical significance. Shas can get anywhere between 7 and 14, Agudah can get anywhere between 4 and 10, etc. As with every election, the surprises will come down at the bottom and will strongly impact the overall results. Keep your eyes posted especially on Chadash and Ichud Leumi, both of which are likely to make the pollsters look foolish.

The good Knesset members are the ones who are steadfast in their loyalties and commitments, but still know how to find common ground with others. MK Harav Avraham Ravitz, who passed away yesterday, was one of the good guys.

On matters of religion and state, he knew what was important and what was not. One example, of which I have personal knowledge, involved discussions between Ravitz and a certain MK from Shinui, who would go at each other quite viciously in committee meetings on constitutional issues involving religion. When the chips were down, though, the two of them reached important compromises that protected the key interests of their respective constituencies.

Ravitz struggled to get Haredi education funded on the basis of clear and measurable principles, rather than intrigues behind closed doors. Unfortunately, his struggle was not against the chilonim, but rather against Haredi makhers, who -- as he well understood -- preferred that matters be settled in the smoke-filled rooms so that the yeshivot would be dependent on their wheeling-dealing. In general, he was brutally honest about Haredi politics. He once commented to me with some embarrassment that a certain reasonable compromise had been killed by the Haredi side because "some kanoi fed narishkeit" to a certain rov.

With MK Harav Ravitz's passing, the Haredi world lost an effective spokesman. But more broadly, the Knesset lost an effective and thoughtful parliamentarian and the Jewish People lost a devoted servant and mentsch.

To the surprise of absolutely nobody, the Supreme Court accepted the appeals of the Arab parties Ra'am-Ta'al and Balad against the decision of the Elections Board that had disqualified them from running in the upcoming elections.

The background is this. Basic Law: The Knesset makes quite explicit who is ineligible to run for the Knesset. Paragraph 7a states that any party (or candidate) that has among its aims (1) the negation of the Jewish and democratic character of the State, or (2) incitement to racism, or (3) support of an armed struggle against the State is ineligible. The Elections Law clarifies that the determination of in/eligibility is made by the Elections Committee (which consists of representatives of the parties, though not necessarily MKs).

Now, Balad, which was lead for many years by Azmi Bishara, who has fled the country amidst charges of spying for Hizbollah during the Lebanon war, would seem to be a prime candidate for disqualification on points (1) and (3) (and possibly (2) as well, even though that item is intended for Jews). Armed with plenty of evidence, Aviad B began pushing the case for disqualification. Yisrael Beiteinu, which knows a good thing when it sees one, quickly took over the case. Ichud Leumi jumped into the fray and sought disqualification of Ra'am-Ta'al (Ahmad Tibi's party) as well.

In the end, the committee voted 26-3 to disqualify Balad and 21-3 to disqualify Ra'am-Ta'al. (Representatives of the Labor party supported the disqualification of Balad but not that of Ra'am-Ta'al. BTW, this didn't stop Ofir Pines-Paz from attacking the decision as if his own party hadn't voted for it.)

According to Paragraphs 63-64 of the Elections Law, the determination of ineligibility with regard to an individual candidate requires confirmation by the Supreme Court (which means they can rule on substance), while determination of ineligibility of a party can be appealed to the Supreme Court (which sounds like they can only rule on procedural grounds). In any event, the Court over-ruled the disqualification, but has not yet given the grounds for their ruling.

Don't hold your breath that any legal grounds are forthcoming, since there aren't any. The Attorney General opined that the cases lacked evidence. This is a stretch to say the least. In the case of Balad, the party's response to the charges essentially confirmed them. The only argument that can be made in defense of Balad is that the Court holds that the law should say that a party is disqualified only if it advocates violent means to negate the Jewish and democratic character of the State. But, of course, the law does not actually say that.

The Court's over-reaching aside, I doubt that we stand to gain much by keeping marginal extremist parties out of the Knesset. It won't change the balance of power in the Knesset, nor will it diminish the dissemination of pernicious views. These views should be thoroughly discredited as vile, anti-Semitic and dangerous; outlawing the parties that promote them is one way to achieve that goal, but hardly the most effective one. Law is a poor substitute for substance.

In general, the law for disqualifying parties should be exceedingly difficult to invoke. The temptation for political parties to disqualify each other must be quite great and allowing them to disqualify on the basis of intentions is surely an invitation to mischief. And, if the religious parties ever get their act together and threaten the powers that be, you can bet that someone (probably Ofir Pines-Paz) will get the bright idea that they wish to negate the democratic character of the State.

A few comments on the just-ended war in Gaza and how it has and will effect our relationships with Europe, with Hamas and with each other.

By far the most important lesson from this war is that Israelis have the will and the ability to fight and fight well. This war showed that many of the weaknesses exposed by the Lebanon fiasco have been addressed. Also, whether or not Rachel Imeinu actually showed up to give combat tips, this war will -- in retrospect -- come to be seen as a salient step in the ascendancy of traditionalism as the cornerstone of a new Israeli ethos. (Ironically, the imminent demise of sectarian Religious Zionist politics is another key step in this ascendancy; more about this another time.)

In terms of its impact on Hamas, it obviously would have been better if we bombed them until they cried Uncle. We could have made a laundry list of demands including the release of Gilad Schalit, the beginning of the disbanding of UNWRA and so on. But, the truth is that that was never a realistic goal and further fighting is unlikely to have achieved it. A realistic goal that was not achieved, and for which we will pay a huge price, is retaking the Philadelphi route. This was a blunder, plain and simple. Other than that, the war restored our deterrence and destabilized the Hamas regime in the long run. My guess is that we will not be seeing many rockets for a good while now. (I hope tomorrow's headlines don't prove the foolishness of publishing predictions.)

On the diplomatic front, a few good things and a few bad ones. The bad ones all are closely tied to our Foreign Minister being a complete moron. The main culprit in the events that made this war inevitable is Egypt, which aided and abetted weapons smuggling into Gaza from the beginning. But instead of shouting this from the rooftops and taking measures to pressure Egypt into allowing others to prevent smuggling, our Foreign Ministry allowed Egypt to take center stage as peacemaker and negotiator. In the end, as many times before, Livni placed her faith in worthless paper and photo-ops for preventing smuggling from Egypt into Gaza instead of ensuring a physical presence on the border that might actually achieve this. (Olmert had a moment of pleasure at her expense when he sent her off to the U.S. to sign a meaningless document so that she'd miss the press conference where he declared victory.)

The good development on the diplomatic front is the one that, to my amusement, gets most people of good will rather exercised. Europeans (and Jewish apostates) are truly threatened by our moral superiority. The obviousness of this superiority so frightens them that they twist themselves into pretzels trying to level the playing field. Trust me, friends, you needn't shout yourselves blue in the face explaining that the goyim wouldn't set up humanitarian corridors for their enemies' benefit in middle of a war. For God's sake, who knows this better than them? They are the Goyim; you think they don't know what goyim would and wouldn't do? The more hysterically they try to tear us down, the more certain you can be that they get the point.

All I want from the Europeans is that they fear and respect us. That roving band of clueless European Ministers posing for photos today wasn't here after Lebanon, if you know what I mean. Fear and respect.

When rockets started to land in Ashdod, the heads of the Grodno Yeshiva (a satellite of Ponevezh in Ashdod) asked the great sage Rav Elyashiv shlit"a what to do. This is what Rav Elyashiv shlit"a said:

Under no circumstances should the yeshiva leave Ashdod. First of all, the zechus of their Torah learning would protect them. It is incumbent upon them to have bitachon in Hashem. Second, it would harm the morale of others in Ashdod if the Yeshiva were to abandon them, especially as the people of Ashdod are extremely cognizant of the great merit that the Yeshiva brings to their town. Third, since the bochurim are young and able-bodied and many people in the town are elderly or sick, it is important for the bochurim to do all they can to help those people who need assistance. Of course, since the reason that the bochurim are not involved in the war effort as soldiers is that they are immersed in learning, it is especially important that every moment not spent on chessed be spent on learning.

The kiddush Hashem that the Grodno Yeshiva caused through their exemplary behavior in Ashdod during the course of the war in Gaza is no doubt one of the reasons that Tzahal has been zocheh to such success in the war effort. May Hashem grant Rav Elyashiv arichus yamim veshanim and continued ability to shepherd Klal Yisrael with the wisdom and compassion that has characterized his leadership for so many years.

I've been deliberately avoiding politics during the war but I want to test out a piece I was asked to write about why I'm voting for Likud. Any comments will be duly note for the final version.
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The core of the next government will consist of Likud and Kadima. From Netanyahu's point of view, it would be madness to try to hold together a narrow majority including Yisrael Beiteinu and three or four religious parties, each with its own agenda. Once he brings Kadima into the fold, the other parties will line up to join the coalition at virtually no cost.

What then remains to be decided? Only the extent of Likud's leverage in the negotiations with Kadima. If Likud can wield a plausible right-wing alternative in its negotiations with Kadima, it will be the dominant partner; otherwise, it will pay a steep price to land and keep Kadima.

The difference between a Likud-led government with Kadima in it and a Likud-Kadima government may sound subtle, but it is crucial. The next government will be faced, inter alia, with two central tasks. First, it will need to reframe the terms in which the Arab-Israeli conflict has been so recklessly conceived since the Oslo days. It is not a dispute that requires a solution, it is a war that requires victory. Second, it will need to remedy the systemic flaws, beginning with a selectively hyperactive justice system, that permit a self-appointing post-Zionist elite to wield inordinate power over state policy.

I confess that it is not clear that, with regard to these two issues, Likud is the solution. What is clear is that Kadima is part of the problem and Likud offers an upgrade. With regard to the first issue, Bibi, and especially some of his defense advisors, at least appreciate the lunacy of the negotiations in which Kadima, and especially the ever-desperate Livni, are so over-invested, though it is admittedly unlikely that they will withstand American pressure to keep these negotiations on the agenda. With regard to the second issue, Bibi and most of the Likud may fear the ruling elite, but at least -- for the most part -- they don't identify with them. (Unfortunately, I need to temper even that modest claim with the observation that three of the Likud's leading candidates for Justice Minister are poodles of Bagatz -- one out of convenience, one out of willful naivete, and one out of sheer snobbery.)

As unattractive as are the two options -- a Likud government with Kadima in it or a Likud-Kadima government -- it is clear that our objective must be to achieve the former option. There are no others. And the best way to strengthen Likud vis-a-vis Kadima is to vote for Likud.

Those who believe that Mafdal or Ichud Leumi can "restrain Bibi from the right" might consider the real difference between those parties. The Mizrochnikim in Mafdal imagine that failing to kowtow to the powers-that-be is a repudiation of Zionism itself. (For those who've forgotten, Mafdal's failure to leave Sharon's government even on the eve of the Knesset vote on the hitnatkut bill facilitated passage of that bill.) They will sit in any government and will have absolutely no influence. The ideologues of Ichud Leumi, on the other hand, only know what ought to be done lechatchila, and have nothing useful to contribute to politics, which is the art of the bedieved. They will not sit in any government and will have absolutely no influence. For precisely that reason, the more seats they have, the less the chances of a narrow right-wing coalition and hence the less leverage Likud has against Kadima.

In fact, the only party that can restrain Bibi from the right is Likud. So, hold your nose and vote Likud.

I've been feeling awful about going on with my everyday life, while people in the south are suffering and soldiers are fighting. So I went down to Sderot to visit my friend Miki who has been living there for the past year. I hoped that I might somehow make myself useful there, even if only by showing the locals some solidarity.

You'll have to forgive me but I'm going to have to slide into sappy cliches here because there is no other way to describe what I experienced. I think I met a fair number of the world's lamed-vav tzadikim there. Miki himself is a well-known figure who could spend his time seeking publicity. But, as I shlepped around Sderot with him this is what transpired:

As we walked through the streets, your typical development town bench-sitters came over to discuss the matzav. The standard hello is "If we had done this eight years ago after the first Kassam, or at least after the first Kassam after the hitnatkut, we wouldn't be in this mess." There ends the "duh" part of the dialogue. Here's the continuation. First guy: "Since the Kassam hit my house last year, my wife has been paralyzed and I have to take care of our four kids by myself. And three weeks ago I had to close my shop, since there's no street traffic." Second guy: "But, baruch hashem, we're not miskenim. I'm just worried about my son in Gaza. Oh, and my daughter. Ever since she was injured by a Kassam two years ago, she hasn't been able to go to school."

Then, suddenly a loud recorded voice "Tzeva Adom, Tzeva Adom" sends everyone scurrying for the nearest shelter. A few seconds later there's a loud boom and everyone resumes what they were doing without comment.

Miki takes me to check out a bomb shelter outfitted as an after-school hangout where Ethiopian kids can get help with homework and play on computers Miki managed to find funding for. A fellow in his early twenties with a nose ring who directs the activities calmly explains to Miki what problems need attention and Miki makes a few calls to try to solve them.

As we drive to another such shelter, another Tzeva Adom sends us racing to the nearest bus shelter. Wait for the boom, resume life. I'm beginning to get the idea.

Another shelter better outfitted than the first with board games, art supplies, computers and mattresses. A young fellow with three earrings is taking care of Yisrael Meir and a few other kids of varying ages and backgrounds. He tells me that the shelter functions 24 hours a day since some families are afraid to stay in their apartments at night. Miki listens to the list of problems, makes some calls to solve them. No reporters, no photographers.

Next we head to a bomb shelter to which City Hall has relocated. This is headquarters also for pikud ha-oref, in charge of dealing with the fallout from the Kassams. As soon as we enter, another Tzeva Adom and then, immediately after, another. Everyone jumps into action. No need to run-- this shelter could probably withstand a nuclear warhead -- but presumably everyone down here has some job to do when a rocket lands.

Then we head over to a hill on the edge of town that overlooks Gaza. Various photographers, police and just gawkers come and go. One local couple has brought a lawn chair and binoculars and provide commentary. The routine is machine gun fire ("That's our guys trying to prevent an imminent rocket launch") followed by a puff of smoke ("We missed. The black smoke means it's a grad, the angle of the smoke show's it's headed towards Beer Sheva.") Up here, we have time to talk some politics and Miki asks me to explain to him again why I think Feiglin was ripped off by the decision to lower him on the list. He gets it.

Another Tzeva Adom. I'm beginning to get blase.

On the way back to my home planet, I stop in Ofakim to visit my son, who's with a bunch of teenagers volunteering. They're taking care of kids in a shelter. He hasn't got a nose ring or earrings, but he's a good kid.

It is true that the cannons are speaking now, but what is most interesting about this war is the silence of certain key players. In each case, this silence is either promising or ominous.

First, Olmert et al. have been silent about the objectives of this war. The proper objective is victory, namely, pounding the enemy into submission. Yet, one wonders whether the actual objective is to replace Hamas with some "more moderate" party to whom Israel can surrender Yehuda and Shomron with honor. Or, perhaps the objective is to flex muscles and obtain quiet until the elections. One shudders to think. So long as Olmert doesn't say anything stupid, we must set aside these doubts and support the war.

Second, the ground troops are silent. There are two possibilities. The good one is that we are wisely not walking into traps and instead are planning to use technological means to destroy the tunnels that run through Gaza along with everybody and everything hiding inside them. The bad one is that Ehud Barak has simply lost his nerve, as appears to have been the case over the past several years and as almost stated outright by MK Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael.

Third, Hizaballah is silent. This might mean that they are weary and wary after the summer of 2006. Or it could mean that Syria is trying to build some international goodwill and will be sending the bill once Obama takes office. Or it could mean nothing and tomorrow will look different than today.

Finally, Obama has been silent. I think that means he's busy playing golf.

I promised no more Likud posts but I can't resist a brief expansion on some earlier off-hand remarks.

The Likud primaries rule book is here. Read it!

Three things are absolutely clear:

1. Clause 12 makes clear that the top 21 places on the list are reserved for the leaders on the national list. There is no basis for removing Feiglin from the 20th slot.

2. Clause 27 makes clear that Ratzon and Yatom should not leapfrog into the vacated spots unused by women.

3. Clause 18d makes clear that, since there are four women above 29, Miri Regev has no case whatsoever to be moved up to the 29 spot (now the 27 spot due to the removal of Feiglin and Ratzon).

So two of the three decisions by the court are flat out wrong and rather egregiously so.

There is one drop of justice in all this. MY abandoned principle and arranged an unsavory marriage of convenience with Gila Gamliel, in the expectation that the deal would get enough additional votes for Feiglin to improve his rank on the list. Instead, as a result of votes she got from MY supporters, Gamliel beat Feiglin by 0.2% (I have all the numbers) knocking Feiglin from 19 down to 36. Ouch.

But just as Feiglin's machinations have come back to bite him, Bibi's much worse machinations are going to come back to bite him big time. (And rightfully so. If he can be sent into self-destruct panic mode by Feiglin, how's he going to react to Mr. Ahmadinejad?)

One post-mortem post on the Likud primaries and then we can hopefully move on to topics of broader interest.

The interesting story isn't who did or didn't get in to the top 40. There weren't really that many surprises there (I'll mention the exceptions below). The interesting story is how innocent looking features of the decision mechanism can have significant impact on results.

In this case, the innocent looking feature was the guarantee of the 10 and 20 spots to women. Here's how that played out. Voters had 12 slots to fill on the national list. They correctly realized that by choosing two women (which they were not formally required to do) they'd be getting more bang for their buck, since it would be sufficient to have your favorite women pass the other women, even way down on the list, and they'd shoot up to 10 and 20. (To get the idea, imagine that they said that the top vote-getter with purple hair gets the top slot on the list regardless of how few votes s/he got. You'd probably include a purple hair person on your list.)

Well, since there were only around six women running with any traction at all, they all got disproportionately large numbers of votes. In fact, no fewer than four women came in higher than 20th (Ness, Livnat, Hotobeli and Gamliel). But, this anomaly actually triggered a cascade effect. According to the rules, if a slot reserved for women opens up (because a woman came in higher than that slot on her own, so the guarantee wasn't needed), the slot is filled by the next highest vote-getter on the national list. (This is as opposed to the rule used in previous primaries in which everybody -- including those in slots reserved for regional candidates -- moved up.) As a result, the vacated women's slots at 20, 24 and 29 were filled by Feiglin, Ratzon and Yatom, all of whom are regarded as hard-core right-wingers. Had this rule not been in effect all three would be much further down the list. (As a result Bibi has sent his lapdog, Ofir Akounis, to the Likud court to try to roll back the rule. The man never misses an opportunity to make an ass of himself.)

As for the list itself, Miri Regev, Assaf Hefetz and Uzi Dayan, all left-wingers jumping on to a rising ship, were dumped way down the list. But Dan Meridor and Yossi Peled made the top 20, which is very unfortunate. It is also unfortunate that Miki Eitan is as low as 16 since his leverage for the Justice Ministry is now close to zero and the alternatives are considerably worse. But, other than that, there is nothing unexpected about the list other than the aforementioned success of the women (especially Hotobeli) and, if you didn't see it coming, Feiglin getting in at 20 (and maybe the poor performance of Yechiel Leiter).

As for Feiglin's impact on the list, you need to understand how MY's recommendation list was constructed. As I've explained, MY exists to advance Feiglin. The other people on the list were chosen according to three criteria that all serve that purpose. Some people were chosen because they were going to get in ahead of Feiglin anyway. The fact that all these ended up at the top of the list is not a result of MY's support for them but rather the reason for MY's support for them. Some were chosen because they were hopeless and therefore no threat to pass Feiglin (I suspect Hotobeli was an example of this that backfired). Finally, some were chosen because they made deals with Feiglin. The most egregious of these was Gila Gamliel and ironically the result of this deal was that Gila Gamliel passed Feiglin and almost bumped him deep down the list (and still might if Bibi's nefarious plot succeeds).

Other consequences of MY's recommendations are that Miki Eitan (not recommended by MY) is down at 16, Yariv Levine beat Gabi Avital in the Shfela region (both are good), Boaz Haetzni beat Yossi Fuchs in Yesha (both are good but Yossi probably would make the better MK) and Sagiv Asulin is in the 35 spot. Neither of MY's olim recommendations got in. All in all, then, MY had some impact on the results but it could hardly be said that the impact was especially positive.

But Feiglin is in at 20 (which I think is a good thing) and, take my word for it, Michael Fuah doesn't give a damn about all the rest of them.

Update: Here is the Likud's takanon bechirot. As far as what to do when the women's positions open up, the plain reading of clauses 12 and 27 would indicate that Feiglin has a strong case (clause 12) but Michi Ratzon and Ehud Yatom have a problem (clause 27).

In this follow-up to my previous post, I will add a few updates regarding the Likud primaries, but mainly I'll discuss Manhigut Yehudit and Moshe Feiglin.

First of all, Netanyahu did manage to get a few rules changed at the last minute for reasons I discussed earlier. Voters will choose 12 (rather than 10) candidates from the national list. In addition, voters choose two olim separately. Finally, voters choose a single regional candidate (no change there).

I mostly stand by what I said earlier. However, given the expanded national list and the fact that two women will get high spots regardless, I'm inclined to include two women on the ballot. Certainly, the best candidates among the women are Tzipi Hotobeli and Leah Ness. These candidates are far superior to Limor Livnat, Gila Gamliel and Miri Regev.

I am now more positive about Moshe Kahlon, Gilad Erdan and Yechiel Leiter than was expressed earlier.

Another very worthy newcomer I failed to mention earlier is Moshe Muskal.

Since you need to choose two oleh candidates, I support both Asya Entov and Ariel Bolshtein.

Finally, as a result of another rule change, Ayoub Kara is a shoo-in, so I wouldn't waste a vote on him.

In short, my list currently looks like this: (Updated Sunday Dec. 7, 9:00 PM)
Edelstein
Eitan
Rivlin
Shteinitz
Erdan
Yaalon
Hotobeli
Ness
Feiglin
Kahlon
Jabotinsky
Muskal

(After Jeffrey's persuasive arguments (see comments below), I have added Zev Jabotinsky. I have removed Yechiel Leiter (nobody seems willing to stand up for him) and, with great reluctance, I've removed Michi Ratzon, who is a good guy. I have stuck with the dark horse, Moshe Muskal, who led the revolt of bereaved parents against Olmert following the Lebanon fiasco, for emotional reasons. My list and that of My Obiter Dicta are now identical except that he prefers Ratzon to Feiglin, for reasons I myself explain below. I suspect that when he's finished, Jameel's list will also be fairly similar.)

For my region (Yosh), I'll vote for Yossi Fuchs. For olim, Entov and Bolshtein.

Note that I am voting for Feiglin. I'll use the rest of this post to explain as objectively as I can exactly what is good and bad about Manhigut Yehudit.

On the positive side, Feiglin simply has a better grasp of the core issues in Israeli politics than any of the other candidates. He understands that our problems are systemic and will not be repaired without systemic reform. He understands that our problems are rooted in a crisis of identity among the elites who have a stranglehold on the country (as a result of the systemic problems). And, finally, he understands that these problems will not be addressed until religious and/or right-wing Israelis join mainstream parties.

I also don't buy the spin that he will cost the Likud votes, although I agree that if the spin were true, it should be a very important factor in deciding whether to vote for him.

My problem with Feiglin has to do with Manhigut Yehudit's tactics. (More specifically, I mean Michael Fuah's tactics, since he runs the tactical end of MY completely on his own. For the most part, even Feiglin doesn't have a clue what Fuah is up to.) Fuah has made a series of idiotic moves that can only be understood if you first understand that for him getting Feiglin into the Knesset (and beyond) is not a means to achieving certain worthy ends but rather an end in itself -- in fact, the only end.

As a result, when faced with a choice between advancing Feiglin's career or advancing MY's ostensible substantive objectives, Fuah will always choose the former. Concretely, what this means is that politicians of dubious repute and conviction who are willing to make deals with MY (and it's no surprise that such people are willing to make deals; that's what they live for) will always get MY's support while those who share pretty much all of MY's objectives except the coronation of Moshe Feiglin will always get shafted. Just to give you the flavor, MY supported Olmert in 2003, without which support he would not have gotten into the Knesset. MY massively supported Haim Katz in 2003 in exchange for which he betrayed them, so (like the Woody Allen character who fell into the orchestra pit at a show and repeated the performance the next thirty nights so as not let on it was an accident) they did it again in 2006. In 2006, MY supported a slew of stinkers but gave almost no support to Uzi Landau and Yuli Edelstein.

In 2008, MY is supporting Gila Gamliel (who sold her vote to Sharon for a Deputy Ministry, promotes socialist economic policies and hasn't got any brains or principles to speak of). In the municipal elections in Beit Shemesh, MY supported Daniel Vaknin, who is not only incompetent and corrupt but an enthusiastic hitnatkut supporter. They are following this up by supporting his deputy, Cathy Sheetreet, for the Jerusalem slot (against Fred Moncharsh, who has been one of MY's most loyal and active supporters since the beginning). MY had also negotiated deals to support two of the most odious candidates running in the regional primaries, Carmel Shama (Gush Dan) and Even Tzur (North), but it appears that the threat of revolt has forced Fuah to back down on those. Do NOT vote for any of these candidates, even if MY asks you to.

Moreover, not all of MY's lunacy takes place during election season. During Sharon's nasty reign, Uzi Landau attempted to unify the opposition. But, as a result of some dubious deals designed to advance Feiglin, MY aligned with Yisrael Katz's camp instead. This lead to all sorts of mischief. For example, on August 18, 2004, Sharon tried to bring Labor into his coalition for the purpose of advancing the hitnatkut and needed the approval of the Likud Central Committee. A watered down (but just as pernicious) version of the proposal was opposed by Landau's camp but supported by Katz's camp. Incredibly, Fuah initially announced support for this proposal on the 5:00 PM news. Only under pressure, did MY finally oppose the proposal, which lost by 12 votes (765 - 753). (This was Sharon's first attempt; in December, he did succeed in bringing Labor into his coalition.)

In short, there are good reasons to support Feiglin, but by all means ignore any guidance MY gives regarding other candidates.

Here's everything you need to know about the Likud primaries, which are scheduled for December 8.

There are 98,000+ eligible voters. Each voter can choose ten candidates on the national list and one candidate from among those running in the region in which the voter is registered. (A candidate can either run for a national slot or a regional slot, not both.)

Positions 2 through 21 (following Netanyahu) on the Likud list for Knesset will be filled by the top 20 vote-getters in the primary. The exception is that the top women vote-getters are bumped up to slots 10 and 20, in the event that they did not earn better slots. The top olim and young people also get bumped up (but I don't recall to which slots). After that, the slots are distributed to the top vote-getters in each region and assorted exotica.

Before naming names, it is worthwhile to consider some tactical issues raised by the above-mentioned rules. First note that the fact that each voter chooses 10 national candidates, but 20 national candidates make the cut (before we get into the netherworld of slots 22 to 40). To appreciate the implications of this, imagine (for the sake of simplicity) that Likud voters consist of two camps: blue (60%) and orange (40%). Suppose that the blues and oranges each have a preferred list of 20 national candidates, with little overlap. If each voter could choose 20 candidates (rather than 10, as is actually the case), the blue camp could get all 20 of its candidates elected. However, when each voter can only choose 10 candidates, a lot depends on how each camp distributes its votes over its 20 preferred candidates. In the extreme case, where the blues distribute their votes uniformly, while the oranges all agree on their top 10, the oranges can take the top 10 slots. In less extreme cases (e.g. both camps distribute their votes normally), the oranges are at least assured of getting close to half their preferred candidates in, even if closer to the bottom of the top 20. Bibi (who thinks of himself as the head of the metaphorical blue camp) has belatedly wisened up to this and is trying to slide the size of the ballots up from 10 closer to 20.

A second tactical issue involves how a voter should distribute his votes. Any ballot with fewer than 10 names chosen is disqualified. Suppose you really care about five candidates and are indifferent about the rest. Your best tactic might be to vote for your five and then choose five hopeless candidates, since choosing five promising candidates might be to the detriment of those you care about. If you do so, you might as well choose women, olim and young people, since these slots are guaranteed, so you'd be getting the most bang for your buck.

Taking all this into account, who are the candidates to vote for? I won't mince words here.

Let's dispense with the Feiglin issue at the outset. Feiglin will do what is best for Manhigut Yehudit because he believes that what is good for MY is ultimately good for Israel. If you share that belief, vote for him. If you don't, don't vote for him.

As for the current crop of MKs, there are exactly four who have intelligence and integrity: Yuli Edelstein, Miki Eitan, Ruby Rivlin and Yuval Shteinitz. There might be others who are more strident in promoting views with which I agree, but we should all know by know that stridency is an unreliable barometer.

One note on this. Some of you are probably wondering why I prefer Miki Eitan (who voted for hitnatkut) to Gideon Saar (who voted against it). The answer is that both are candidates for the Justice Ministry and on all matters related to the justice system, ME is far more reliable than GS. (If you trust me on anything, trust me on this.)

With regard to the other current MKs, Gilad Erdan is okay, though a bit of an over-ambitious never-did-anything-but-politics type. The rest, forget about.

Of the newcomers, if Meridor gets in he will simply be the representative of Beinisch and Aharon Barak in the Knesset. He is a dangerous man. Bibi correctly understands that Meridor and the other lefty opportunist now jumping on the bandwagon (Dayan, Hefetz, Peled) will bring in a few extra seats from the center, but I believe he underestimates the damage they will do subsequently -- or, worse, he doesn't care. (Aside: Uzi Dayan is a good person with many good ideas. My beef with him is strictly on the issues.)

The exception is Bogie, who is terrific. (Benny Begin is a deranged super-mamlachti who will be manipulated by Meridor.)

Another newcomer is Yechiel Leiter, whom I'd like to like. He is dati, Anglo, educated and has real ideas. Unfortunately, in the manner of briefcase carriers basking in reflected glory, as Bibi's guy he has developed a certain arrogance that has rubbed many people the wrong way. If someone would like to come to his defense, I promise to copy the substance of any comments into the body of this post.

As for ex-MKs trying to return, Ayoub Kara is a courageous friend of the Jews, even if not a genius. Same for Michi Ratzon (who is, of course, Jewish).

If you're inclined to throw a vote to someone running for one of the oleh spots, the situation is as follows. One leading candidate is the kind of guy whom you'd cast as Gaydamak's henchman, another is a Kadima MK trying to hang on (sorry bub, no way), another is supported by Feiglin for personal reasons but is otherwise not qualified. This leaves Asia Entova and Ariel Bolshtein. Take your pick.

For the regionals, I'll only discuss my region (Yosh), where the candidates are Yossi Fuchs, an attorney from Neveh Daniel, who has done excellent work on behalf of the Gush Katif refugees and has brought many "Bagatzim" (always for good causes, though sometimes unwittingly and unwisely aiding the empowerment of the Court). The other is Boaz Haetzni, who is a wonderful writer with very strong right-wing views. My guess is that Yossi would be the more effective parliamentarian.

Last night's Likud convention was a rather civilized affair, as these things go. I'll tell you why. During three hours of speeches, the names of various suspicious characters now trying to piggyback on the Likud's rising fortunes -- Dan Meridor, Assaf Chefetz, Uzi Dayan, et al. -- were not mentioned even a single time. (I was paying careful attention.) If these names had been mentioned, the facade of unity and civility would have come crashing down.

Of course, the exception is Benny Begin, who was treated like royalty. He will come out right near the top in the primaries. Unfortunately, Begin Junior is a hopelessly uptight white guy whose exaggerated sense of propriety will be exploited by manipulative self-righteous pricks like Meridor. Buyer beware.

Most people who sound off on politics share the rather tedious habit of being mindless partisans. The interesting ones identify strongly with a point of view generally associated with some political camp, but still manage to call 'em as they see 'em. One such person is Camille Paglia, whose in-your-face raunchy style is not in the least off-putting (to me) because it is accompanied by total disrespect for the orthodoxies of her own camp as well as others.

For one outstanding example, her fisking of Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin's feminist anti-pornography crusade is priceless. (I couldn't find it online but her book Vamps and Tramps is worth getting just for the MacKinnon and Dworkin stuff. Warning: This stuff is not suitable for those who are, um, makpid on shemiras einayim and oznayim or would have their kids believe that they are.) This week she has a piece in Salon on Obama and Palin that is very much worth reading (especially the second page).

(Nudnik pre-emption: Yes, my definition of "tedious" and "partisan" in this context is equally applicable to right and left.)

Barack Obama won't get a hundred days of grace from Iran, but he gets one day of grace from me.

Obama has the best qualities of good academics, but only a few of the flaws. He is thoughtful, intelligent, charismatic, articulate, rarely flustered and meets arguments head-on. At the same time, he is grounded, a skilled manager and delegater and is never petty or vain.

In many ways, he and his rise to power represent all that is great about America.

His one flaw (sorry, even his day of grace doesn't justify ignoring the main point) is that he is beholden to a doctrinaire liberal philosophy that distorts reality, punishes the virtuous and undermines the ability of Western society to defend itself. But enough about that; unfortunately, I'll have four years to hammer that point home.

Tony McPeak. Samantha Power. Richard Lugar.


To all my friends who are voting for Obama:

I have only one small request. When the day comes that you are ashamed to look me in the eye (and it will come soon), please don't insult my intelligence by telling me that you had no way of knowing. You knew. You had other priorities.

Event 1: At 10:00 PM, PM Livni announces that negotiations with Shas have reached a deadlock and we are headed to elections.
Event 2: At 1:00 AM, by order of DM Barak, hundreds of troops destroy Noam Federman's house near Hevron with no warning and a maximum of violence and cruelty (press barred) predictably leading to local hotheads making an ugly scene (press invited) predictably leading to the usual suspects condemning all settlers and fanning the flames of hatred.

If you think this is a coincidence, ask yourself: cui bono?

I've been lazy about blogging lately, so this will be three posts in one.

1. My eternal lawsuit has been settled. After four years of inventing ever more creative ways to keep this case from reaching beis din, my adversary finally ran out of delaying tactics and agreed to terms I am not allowed to discuss. A full description of the delaying tactics could fill a book. Among other things his lawyers went to civil court to get the beis din disqualified on grounds that included a) a part-time secretary at the beis din is a distant relative of my wife, b) the beis din wouldn't allow his crooked toen to appear before it, c) the beis din was discredited by its involvement in the Tendler affair. In the end, his delaying served me well. First of all, I got an education regarding how batei din operate. Secondly, I didn't have a chance to put the money in the stock market.

2. My Obiter Dicta and Jameel finally got me to watch the dati tele-novella, Serugim. I enjoyed it. It was familiar and unfamiliar. I lived in the "bitza" in Katamon (and near Katamon) as a single for many years and stayed in the neighborhood for many more years after I got married. My wife is a graduate of Maaleh, the dati film schoool from which many of the people involved with Srugim graduated. But my single days in Katamon were a long time ago. There weren't that many of us back then and our lives weren't so insulated from the families around us. Also, some of the conflicts dealt with in the show were more stark and intense for me than they seem to be for the characters in the show. (I acknowledge that this might be a trivial observation since one's own experiences are always more vivid than somebody else's, but I think there's more to it than that.) In any event, we are finally past Kuni Lemel and, lehavdil, HaHesder. Datiim on TV are now real people. Dayenu.

3. Bogie Yaalon's new book, Derech Arukah Ketzarah, is a must-read. It is a first-person story that names names. In short, Bogie says that Dov Weisglass and Omri Sharon corrupted the political system and the army, hijacked the country and caused significant long-term diplomatic and military damage. Mofaz is a dope who didn't understand the job of a Defense Minister and Dan Halutz's arrogance left the IDF unprepared for war. Both were willing dupes of Weisglass and the Sharons and were appointed for just that reason. Like the author of any memoir, Bogie is looking out for his own reputation here, but his account comes off as coherent, believable and frightening. I have met him in small forums on several occasions and he is exceedingly modest, unassuming and direct. His account is important and will be assiduously ignored by the Israeli MSM. I hope to cover it in detail soon.

Where in the world would somebody get the idea to plant a homemade bomb at the door of an ideological opponent?

I'll tell you. In 1952, a bomb was planted at the door of Transportation Minister David Zvi Pinkas. The house was severely damaged and Pinkas, who was home but not directly injured, dies two months later of a heart attack. Police caught radical writer, Amos Keinan, leaving the scene. Keinan stood trial for the bombing and was acquitted for lack of evidence, though he was widely believed to have perpetrated the act along with Shaltiel Ben-Yair.

Keinan's wife, Nurit Graetz, has just written a biography of him, in which she reports that he was indeed guilty. He confessed to her that he bombed Pinkas's house to protest Pinkas's religious world-view.

Keinan was no angry teenager. He has been a prominent spokesman for the radical left in Israel since the founding of the State. He is the toast of the very people who are certain that the very foundations of Israeli democracy are under threat because of the Sternhell ("to know him is to need an alibi") incident.

And, of course, he and Sternhell are no strangers to each other. They were co-signed on a petition to the High Court in 2003, against the appointment of Dan Halutz as Ramatkal, on the grounds that he ordered the bombing of Saleh Shehade in Gaza. The petititioners are an all-star team of pernicious characters, who further appealed to international tribunals to arrest Israeli army commanders.

Unfortunately, Keinan is too senile to offer a sanctimonious condemnation of the Sternhell bombing, but fear not. Yehonatan Gefen has decided that today is just the day to write a glowing testimonial to Amos Keinan, along with an enthusiastic recommendation of Graetz's book.

It is now undeniable: Barack Obama is a radical. (Addendum: Perhaps a better way to phrase that would be: The organization that gave Obama his start in political life was one with a distinctly radical agenda. This could be an indication of where his instinctive sympathies lie.) (Addendum 2: Way too many addenda lately. I really ought to start paying better attention.)

Researcher Stanley Kurtz has been pursuing Obama's links to SDS bomber and unreformed radical William Ayers for many months. He has finally gained access to the Chicago Annenberg Challenge (CAC) archives in the Daley Library and the findings are absolutely conclusive. Despite Obama's denials, he and Ayers cooperated closely in pursuing an unmistakably radical educational agenda in Chicago.

The Daley archives show that Mr. Obama and Mr. Ayers worked as a team to advance the CAC agenda…The CAC's agenda flowed from Mr. Ayers's educational philosophy, which called for infusing students and their parents with a radical political commitment, and which downplayed achievement tests in favor of activism.

Read Kurtz's full article here.

Two quick observations on current events.

First, I think the arguments about whether Mofaz was screwed by foile shtick in the Kadima primaries are irrelevant. Peres would have asked Livni to try to form a government, even if Mofaz had narrowly won the primary.

Second, for those who missed it, the judicial appointments committee met today and it was an epic fiasco. The three Justices on the committee argued (based on unfounded arguments raised in a 2005 Supreme Court decision permitting a caretaker government to make appointments) that a caretaker government cannot make appointments to the Court. Mazuz was called in to offer a legal opinion, but apparently the Justices had neglected to prep him and he couldn't find any problem with the appointments. So Beinish and Co. just talk their ball and went home.

The subtext here is that Beinish is assuming that, one way or another, her nemesis Friedmann's days as Justice Minister are numbered and she'd prefer to make appointments once a more congenial Justice Minister is in office. Second, the Knesset recently passed a law requiring seven out of the nine members to ratify a candidate for the Supreme Court (five used to be enough). This was the brainchild of Likud MK Gideon Saar, who wanted to strengthen the hand of the three coalition politicians on the committee (there are four politicians on the committee but one of them is, by tradition, an opposition MK) by giving them veto power. The message sent by the Justices today was that there are three of them, too, and now they have veto power even without the help of their two lackeys on the committee. (They could have just politely not reached an agreement on any candidates, but they childishly needed to thumb their noses.)

This is good news. First of all, part of Saar's agenda in pushing this legislation was to prevent serious reform of the appointments procedure. In fact, once a right-wing government is in place, Saar (and, to some extent, Bibi) will be the only ones blocking real reform. Hopefully, today's fiasco will make Saar feel foolish enough to acquiesce to the necessary changes.

Second, the Justices have effectively announced that this caretaker government has no authority to govern. Interesting times ahead.

Addendum: This is too good to be true. Friedmann pointed out tonight that Beinish herself was appointed to the Court by a caretaker government.

Since the newspaper's are wrongly reporting that Kadima members just chose the next Prime Minister, let me clarify the law.

First, so long as Olmert doesn't resign, he remains PM.

Second, if he does resign, there begins a long process of replacing him, during all of which time he remains caretaker PM. (If, in addition to resigning, he also declares himself unable to continue even as caretaker, he is replaced by the Deputy PM -- who happens to be Livni, independently of her victory in the primary. This is extremely unlikely.)

Upon his resignation, the President assigns the opportunity to put together a coalition to the candidate most likely to succeed in doing so. It should be emphasized that, unlike what has been written in countless editorials, the President is not bound to give the first opportunity to Livni. In fact, on one previous occasion (in 1990), Yitzhak Shamir had the best chance to form a coalition after a vote of no-confidence in Shamir's government, but then-President Chaim Herzog, gave the first shot to another candidate -- Shimon Peres. (In what has come to be known as "hatargil hamasriach", Peres failed to form a coalition and then Shamir succeeded. Anyone with lingering sympathy for Aryeh Deri, should pay careful attention to his role in that fiasco.)

Nevertheless, since Livni has made all the right elitist lefty noises, Peres will almost certainly give her the first chance. This is appropriate, given how well Livni's squeeky-clean image plays in, for example, the village of Baka Jat, where she took 172 out of 186 votes. Seems they just love her there.

If Livni fails to put together a coalition within 42 days, Peres can choose another candidate. This process can, in principle, continue until the elections scheduled for 2010, during all of which time Olmert remains caretaker PM. By the way, at any time during this process 61 MKs who agree on a single candidate can force the issue.

Likewise, at any time -- before or after a coalition is formed -- 61 MKs can vote to go to new elections within 90 days. This is very likely to happen.

Addendum: While in the original Basic Law: The Government, the process of choosing a candidate to form a government is iterative, this is no longer the case . As Anonymous comments, under the current version of the law, there can be at most two rounds. On a practical level, this doesn't make much difference since it is highly unlikely that there would ever be more than two candidates with any chance at all of forming a government. On a theoretical level, however, the situation is actually worse than I put it. Since, the sitting PM remains in office until a new government is formed, Olmert could in principle remain PM so long as he lives and lies. Even after elections, so long as nobody succeeds at obtaining the Knesset's approval, the sitting PM continues.

Let's try to make some sense of this week's numerous political developments.

First, the non-story. The police "recommended" indicting Olmert for bribery and various related crimes. If you've watched enough Law and Order, you know that all that happened is that Lieutenant Van Buren has just passed the file over to Jack McCoy. The recommendation is just the police department's way of patting itself on the back for a job well done. An actual indictment is a ways off.

So, in the meantime Olmert is offering the juristocracy a carrot and a stick. The carrot is Ramon's pinui-pitzui proposal. The stick is Friedmann's judicial reform bill.

Let me explain what Friedmann's bill is about.

The authority of courts to strike down legislation as unconstitutional has become a central, though problematic, feature of democracy. Since judicial review of legislation shifts power away from elected representatives, all democracies invoke certain safeguards against abuse of this judicial authority. Thus, in Great Britain, the courts can offer only an advisory opinion that a law violates the (European Union) constitution, but this does not invalidate the law. In France, a parliamentary body, the Conseil Constitutionnel, can rule that a law that has been passed by Parliament is unconstitutional only before it is signed into law. In most other European countries, as well as in the United States, there are judicial bodies that can rule laws unconstitutional, but these bodies are all politically appointed. Moreover, in all countries, there are limitations on what kinds of laws (and administrative acts) the court is prepared to review; certain matters (defense, foreign policy, budget) are universally regarded as non-justiciable. These limitations are generally prudential, not statutory.

The model that is most often discussed in Israel is the Canadian model, which is different than all the above models in some respects. What Canada has in common with the above models is that justices are politically appointed (there are advisory committees, but ultimately the Minister of Justice decides) and certain issues are regarded as non-justiciable. The juristocrats who wish to adopt the Canadian model somehow never show much interest in these aspects, nor are these aspects the subject of this particular proposal of Friedmann (though he is interested also in these issues).

Anyway, the aspect of the Canadian model currently under discussion is what is known in Canada as the "notwithstanding" clause. The idea is that if a law is ruled unconstitutional on certain grounds, Parliament can vote to retain the law, "notwithstanding" the court ruling. (Provincial legislatures also have override power; in fact, the whole idea was a compromise involving provincial autonomy, but never mind.)

The idea of adopting the Canadian model in Israel has its origins in a committee headed by Yaakov Ne'eman for the purpose of drafting a Basic Law on Legislation. (Addendum: Commenter Ben Bayit correctly notes that the true origin of the override in Israeli constitutional law is in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The Ne'eman committee first proposed it as a general principle.) The committee was actually dominated by Aharon Barak, through his shik yingel, Yitzhak Zamir. Their scheme was to create the illusion of balance by claiming that they were simply adopting an existing model, while actually gutting it of all substance. Their "notwithstanding" proposal (paragraph 11) differed from the Canadian model in the following ways:

1. The Canadian override can be invoked also prior to a court ruling; in the Ne'eman (Barak) proposal, it could only be invoked after such a ruling.

2. The Canadian override requires a simple plurality vote (i.e., it can be invoked by a 2-1 vote), whereas the Ne'eman (Barak) model requires 70 votes. As a practical matter, this could never happen.

3. The Canadian override remains in effect for five years and can then be renewed and such renewal can be invoked an indefinite number of times. In the Ne'eman (Barak) model, the override dies forever after five years.

4. The Ne'eman (Barak) override clause is temporary and the whole clause disappears ten years from passage of the proposed bill.

As you can see, the Ne'eman (Barak) bill is an absurd joke. Friedmann is taking the Canadian model a bit more seriously. On the four points above, Friedmann's proposal is as follows:

1. Friedmann sides with Barak that the override is post-hoc and not prophylactic. That's reasonable.

2. Friedmann requires 61 and a differential of at least five votes between pro and con votes on the override. The requirement for 61 is reasonable; the other requirement is dumb and reeks of compromise.

3. In Friedmann's proposal, the override is in effect for five years, but when it terminates, the law remains in effect until the Court invalidates it again. This is actually a bit stronger than the Canadian model in which the law is automatically invalidated after five years unless the override is renewed.

4. Friedmann's proposed law doesn't self-destruct.

In sum, in most aspects Friedmann's override proposal is weaker than the Canadian version. When you add to this the fact that Israel's High Court is generally contemptuous of limitations on justiciability and is largely self-perpetuating, the juristocracy has very little to complain about. But, as My Obiter Dicta points out, they and their peanut gallery are in high dudgeon.

Unfortunately, they can calm down. Olmert is just wielding a stick. The moment the carrot looks more useful, the stick will vanish in a puff of smoke.

I don't know if Sarah Palin walks on water, but I'm pretty sure she can fly.

I mean, how often in the course of human events is one put in mind of the word "spunky". Until Sarah Palins' RNC speech, I hadn't thought of anyone as being spunky since Sally Field as Sister Bertrille in The Flying Nun.

But by the time Palin said that "a small town mayor is like a community organizer just with actual responsibilities", it had dawned on me that she was actually more like Sally Field in Punchline, a housewife who'd rather be doing stand-up.

And you know what: I really really like her.

But seriously folks. My willingness to identify with her made me realize quite how much my own self-image and identity have changed over the years. I quite justifiably always thought of myself as a rootless cosmopolitan. My parents were born on one continent, I was born in another, my kids in a third. I grew up in the heart of the world's most cosmopolitan city. Alienation is my stock in trade and cynicism is my middle name. I certainly know more people who edited the Harvard Law Review than shot moose in Alaska.

And yet. As Palin spoke, I realized that I now identify with those Americans who live in small towns, who love their country and feel deeply rooted in it, who carry guns for defense, who have large families, whose children fight its wars. That's my life now.

Obama is a decent person who seems like a really great guy to shoot the breeze with on the bench during a basketball game or in a dorm room. But, especially when contrasted with Palin, he and his wife and his hard-core supporters just seem like over-privileged whiners, self-obsessed careerists, for whom the poor serve as props in the tedious drama that is their quest for self-definition.

Obama is so yesterday. Bring on the spunky flying moose lady.

This is not about politics. But, just as a dateline, I'll note that if Tzippi Livni looked like Sarah Palin, she'd still suck all the charisma and intelligence clear out of any room she'd walk into.

Now to what's really eating me at the moment. Not once but twice, the Mets lost games over the last few days after intentionally walking two consecutive batters. This is painfully stupid. Let me explain why.

In each case, the winning run was on third base with no outs. Let's first assume that the odds of each of the subsequent hitters getting an out, a walk, a single, a double and so forth are league average and independent of each other. Then, with a runner on third and no outs, the odds of the hitting team eventually scoring the winning run in this inning are 85.9%. After loading the bases, the odds go UP to 87.5%. (The calculations can all be found in The Book.) So, walking the bases loaded is not wise in any case. What makes it dumber, however, is that in fact the odds of a hitter doing something useful with the bases loaded are greater than the odds of that same hitter doing that same thing with only a runner on third (or even with runners on first and third). That's because wuth the bases loaded, a hitter has the advantage of knowing that the pitcher has nowhere to put him, and so has the luxury of waiting for a good pitch to hit.

These two games brought back memories of this game. Ouch.

If you look like Arlo Guthrie with peyos, you were probably at the Acharit Hayamim concert-shebang in Bat Ayin last week. I've been going to that event since before it got its name, when only a few dozen people came to the middle of nowhere to hear, among some more polished stuff, an odd assortment of cave-dwelling acid-heads jamming and trying out new stuff (occasionally involving rooster imitations -- don't ask). They've gone a bit mainstream since then (i.e., they charge money), but I still enjoy the chevre.

It used to be that, if you were talking to someone who gets it, you could describe any Jewish crowd with a couple of words. Chaim Berlin -- Brooklyn College night gang, YU Gushies, NCSY BTs from Lake Wobegon, Lakewood shidduch-shoppers. But a typical gang at this event might consist of a guy in beard, peyos and turbin (suggesting a sort-of Ben Ish Chai effect), a guy in tee-shirt and jeans, short hair and no headgear, a guy looking like Scottie just beamed him down from Woodstock, and of course Arlo Guthrie with peyos. (I'll skip the female profiles; suffice it to say that the analogues were all present and accounted for.) I suppose one day we'll just refer to them as, you know, the Acharit Hayamim people.

Of course, they're engaged in deliberate stereotype-busting. Stereotypes are based on the observation that habits of manner and behavior tend to correlate. If you wear a certain kind of head covering, you probably wear a certain kind of clothes, daven in a certain kind of shul, hold certain views and have friends who are just like you in all those respects. The mixing-and-matching in Bat Ayin reflects a conscious attempt to make stereotypes like that seem ridiculous.

The dynamics of the process remind me of a web search algorithm called scatter-gather. It works in two stages. First an initial collection of documents is clustered automatically into sub-collections each of which is somehow coherent and labeled by its unifying theme (e.g., topic). The searcher chooses a few topics from among these that reflect the area of interest. The documents in the chosen topics are then thrown back together and re-clustered. Lather, rinse, repeat.

Now start with a bunch of Jews. They naturally cluster according to the characteristics that are relevant in a given time and place. (For example, after massive dislocations, ethnic divisions reflecting country of origin might be most prominent; under other circumstances, levels or styles of religiosity might be more decisive.) Then some of the clusters drop out of the game and the remaining ones are re-clustered, possibly along completely different dimensions. When this happens, the old stereotypes become merely vestigial; they no longer have any real descriptive force. So, if you're still awake after that little riff, I admire the Acharit Hayamim gang for being harbingers of the death of the old stereotypes. (And, yeah, it's because some clusters are dropping out of the game.)

And, before you get on my case, I'm aware that more than a few of this chevre tend to think in a rather loose associative manner and some cognitive discipline might serve some of them well. Amusing case in point at Acharit Hayamim: a certain rav from Tekoa was doing shtick between Ehud Banai songs. He was wearing a bekeshe and shtreimel (even though it was an ordinary Tuesday night) and he did a performance (no other word for it) of kiddush levana (most of the rest of us had already done that on Tisha B'Av). He insisted that everybody actually lunge for the moon when he said keshem she-eini yachol lingoa bach, declaring that one day such lunging will indeed succeed. Why this should be so was unclear. Maybe he noticed that the pasuk's conclusion that kach lo yuchlu oivai lingo bi has never worked out, and decided that the premise must be equally unreliable. More likely, he was flattering his audience by letting them know that nothing you say actually has to make any sense, as long as it sounds vaguely Utopian.

A few belated comments on Olmert's non-resignation speech.

First, why was this speech necessary at this time? The deadline for declaring candidacy in the upcoming Kadima primary was fast approaching and, in any event, Olmert had to announce that he did not intend to run. That explains the timing. What he achieved is this: Olmert knows that an indictment is inevitable. He also knows that AG Mazuz is justifiably not eager to serve an indictment while Olmert is a sitting Prime Minister. Thus, Mazuz is likely to delay an indictment so long as he can believe that Olmert is going to resign soon anyway.

But, if no indictment is served, Olmert isn't going anywhere very soon. Let me explain why.

There are three possibilities for what happens after Kadima primaries.

One is that the winner -- Livni (according to the polls) or Mofaz (according to the insiders) -- is able to hold the coalition together or to quickly form an alternative coalition. This appears unlikely, since when Shas smells an election they swing rightward in order to be in position to do what they do best: steal votes from the right and give them to the left.

The second possibility is that, as Haim Ramon has already suggested, Olmert hangs on as PM in order to give the new Kadima head a "chance to form a stable coalition". This could take an awfully long time.

The third possibility is that Olmert actually does resign but no alternative candidate can form a coalition. The president can give a candidate up to 42 days to form a coalition and, if that fails, can give another candidate another 42 days. Lather, rinse, repeat until doomsday. All the while, Olmert is caretaker PM. And even when there are no more candidates or the Knesset votes to disperse itself, Olmert still has 90 more days in which to create a legacy of some sort, God help us. (Who can blame him? Without drastic action, he is doomed to be a latter-day Jimmy "what were we smoking when we elected that guy?" Carter.)

Finally, one comment on Olmert's speech. The great tragedy of the speech is that Olmert's whine about being driven out of office by the justice system without benefit of due process is actually true. Many months ago (pre-Talansky) a former Justice Minister told me that the justice system will not allow Olmert another term. Period. He said this with neither rancor nor approval, just as a fact of Israeli life: if the justice system doesn't like someone, they get rid of them. And the justice system didn't like Olmert because his Justice Minister, Daniel Friedmann, had the temerity to speak Truth to Power (pardon the bombast, but I'm making a point here about where the truth is and where the power is).

But, how seriously are you going to take a guy who, one paragraph earlier, can declare without blushing that "Israel's deterrent capability has improved beyond recognition"?

It's a cliche that "the fact that you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you". But with regard to Olmert, we can safely say that "the fact that they're out to get you doesn't mean you're not a crook".

Too much has already been said about Olmert's corruption. But before I head off for vacation, one observation on how the latest allegations about double- (triple- and quadruple-) billing have changed the picture. Until now Olmert seemed hugely corrupt. Now he just seems small and petty. Small and petty is worse.

Seldom has a man of so few convictions, deserved so many.

I recently received this email from my never-married childhood friend, Alter. Alter is a bit of a cranky fellow with a salty tongue, as will be evident, but I take perverse joy in his style. Take this for what it’s worth.

... So, I was schmoozing with this guy from [a certain left-wing American rabbinical seminary] and he’s whining about the right-wingers not giving them the respect they deserve bla bla bla. He doesn’t see what the big deal is if some guy publishes an article condemning “Israeli brutality” or pointing out that halacha is sometimes “unethical” and needs a little touch-up. What, now being a sensitive soul is a bad thing? And I’m finding myself having surprisingly little sympathy for their plight. As a matter of fact, I was pretty much thinking they were getting what they deserve. Which is pretty strange since last time I checked I’m no frummer than he is, by any measure.

As it happens, I popped in to Chulent last Thursday night. This brought a few thoughts into focus. With this chevre I have no problem at all. Yankel from Williamsburg stands at the door in half-levush sharing casual hugs with the nekeivos as they come in. Some other guy shows up looking liker a biker dude but talking a Satmarer Yiddish. Why do I like these guys so much and have so little patience for those [seminary] guys?

Awright, it’s not like I think Chulent ought to be giving smicha and sending guys out to rabbinify. But maybe that’s the point: the Chulent gang doesn’t want to rabbinify. Good for them.

Anyway, I think what’s bugging me about [seminary] is that too many of these bozos have a self-righteous lefty bullshit preoccupation with some abstraction they call “ethics” that’s got not much to do to do with something a whole lot more concrete called mentschlichkeit. Some of these privileged, effeminized self-worshiping pricks are so busy posturing and yapping about saving the planet or the flora and fauna or the victim du jour, they can barely conceal their contempt for grimy flesh and blood human beings.

Ribbono Shel Olam, if I have to read one more puerile paper shoe-horning halacha into some mitas sedom so that some victim of a day school education can reconcile his little Torah hobby with his true religion, namely, the latest academic spin on the total equality of everything with everything, I will just upchuck my latte.

When I hear one of these guys fretting that some aspect of Torah isn’t “ethical” and oy ve-avoy what are we going to do, I feel like throttling him and shouting deprogrammer-like into his tortured face “Stop taking this stuff so seriously. You think any actual frum yid is going to throw an apikorus into a pit or make a Cohen divorce his raped wife? Trust me, the only moron who’s likely to do that is one who takes everything as seriously as you and your over-earnest semi-Episcopalian putz friends in [seminary] do. Normale mentschen who actually get it, have mastered the art of saying all the right things and making sure what needs to get done gets done. You putzballs will get it pinkt farkert: you’ll twist yourselves into pretzels reconciling halacha with everything-but-halacha until the whole system is in shambles and you’ll end up with the wrong result to boot.”

Shoot me for saying this, but frumkeit’s a game. There are rules. The Chulent chevre know the rules. They just sometimes find the rules a pain in the ass. That’s fine by me. So do I. The [seminary] guys don’t know the number one rule, which is don’t challenge the rules; just do what needs to be done. If you can’t manage even that much, leave the Jew profession to people who get it and go teach Victim Studies in some liberal arts college. Or better yet, join the Marines. Maybe they’ll make a man out of you...

Ad kan mi-ksav yad kodsho. Alter has a penchant for overstating his case. I have left out the name of the seminary he mentioned because as far as I know his comments about the people there have no basis in fact. As he admitted to me, he was teeing off on the closest victim. What he says is probably true about somebody, though I don’t know who and, in all likelihood, neither does he.

To fully appreciate the insanity of today's cabinet decision in favor of releasing killers for two Israeli captives, note that Israel admits that it does not really know if the captives are alive or dead. News flash for the brain dead: if they were alive this morning, they are dead now.

If they are returned dead, Kuntar should be returned the same way. (HT for link to zalman)

Two draft laws that recently passed a first reading in the Knesset are illustrations of how good intentions on the part of short-sighted legislators can lead to bad law, if not catastrophe.

The more benign of the two is a law proposed by MK Gideon Saar of Likud that requires a majority of 80 MKs for ratification of an agreement ceding Israeli sovereignty on the Golan. While the result of such legislation is entirely agreeable, the foolishness lies in the fact that the law itself can be -- and almost certainly will be -- passed with the support of far fewer than 80 MKs. The theoretical possibility of a small number of MKs requiring a large number of MKs for some legislative purpose just makes no sense. It's also futile. Consider the current example: the law requiring 80 MKs for ceding the Golan can be repealed without 80 MKs (either an ordinary majority or 61 MKs would be sufficient, depending on the final draft), so that the support of 80 MKs will, in any event, not actually be required in practice.

Such legislative shenanigans should not be tolerated just for the appearance of some short-term political advantage. In the end they will come back to bite us.

The less benign draft law requires an indicted Prime Minister to resign. To appreciate the full insanity of such a law, consider the current law, apparently passed when cooler heads prevailed. A Prime Minister is only forced to resign when 1) he has been convicted of a crime with moral turpitude AND 2) all appeals have been exhausted AND 3) 61 MKs have voted to depose him. (Note that 61 MKs are always sufficient to replace a Prime Minister, provided that they agree on a replacement; in case of conviction, only the requirement for an agreed replacement is waived.) The reason for all these requirements is simply separation of powers. We don't want the Court to depose a Prime Minister; this is the job of the legislature.

The current proposal would waive ALL three requirements. In fact, any Attorney General could depose a prime Minister at will just by cooking up an indictment. Effectively, this would mean that every Prime Minister would be held hostage to the Attorney General, who could simply raise an eyebrow to get a wayward Prime Minister to fall into line. And since Attorney Generals, though theoretically servants of the government, are in fact servants of the Court, this would only further exacerbate the existing absurd imbalance of power in favor of the judicial branch. It is no wonder that the Court's friends on the left support this legislation, but it is hard to fathom the depth of short-sightedness required for those on the right to support this law, just because its ostensible proximate target is Ehud Olmert.

There is a common thread connecting the above two pieces of silly legislation. In each case, the Knesset does not trust itself to act wisely and honorably in some future instance and hence wishes to now tie its own hands. While each proposed remedy is ineffective, one can hardly argue with the diagnosis.

Olmert will be brought down by the Knesset, not the justice system, which is how it should be in a parliamentary system. Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider on what charges he'll ultimately be nailed by the prosecutors.

The three main charges that are generally mentioned are bribery, campaign finance violations, and not reporting gifts. It will be hard to nail him on any of these.

Bribery -- The prosecution will need to demonstrate that Olmert received money with the intention of providing some quid pro quo (even if no specific such qpq was contemplated). This is a matter of intention and therefore hard to prove. In the case of Talansky, specifically, I doubt Olmert is even guilty of bribery, though I'm fairly sure Talansky passed him bribes from bigger fish.

Campaign financing violations -- This is tricky. Here is the law. Allowances for receiving contributions were intended as a leniency on the gifts law, so that instances in which these allowances do not apply are meant to be handled more stringently. However, due to awkward wording in the original law, instances in which the allowances do not apply are in fact entirely exempt from the sanctions in this law. Now pay careful attention to paragraph 28. The law applies to candidates in a party that has open primaries and only in the nine months preceding elections (these conditions have since been changed).

Again, these limitations were intended as a kula: when these conditions don't hold, receiving any money was intended to be forbidden. Conveniently for Olmert, the Likud did not hold open primaries in the relevant elections, so this law is not applicable to his situation. The Gifts Law is applicable.

Failing to report gifts -- While by any reasonable interpretation of the Gifts Law, Olmert is dead in the water, it is actually the law and not Olmert that is dead. This is because in 2007 the Attorney General needed to effectively destroy the law in order to save Shimon Peres. The State Comptroller had written a scathing report showing that in 2005 Peres had accepted $320,000 from Haim Saban, Bruce Rapoport and S. Daniel Abraham, which he did not report. In order to get him off, Mazuz discovered that paragraph 2 of the Gifts Law refers to "a gift given to a public servant, as a public servant" and decided that Peres received the gifts not as a public servant, but as a symbol. (I am not making this up, I promise.) In other words, that law is dead.

Nevertheless, the prosecution has Olmert dead to rights on at least one charge. Campaign finance laws require that he file an affidavit stating what campaign contributions he received, including a statement that the provided list is complete. Since he presumably did not declare the envelopes from Talansky, he is plainly guilty of entering a false declaration.

Anyway, by the time all this plays out, we will have long forgotten the Dark Period when some trivia question named Olmert was Prime Minister.

Suppose Israel does choose to switch to regional voting, with a single winner in each region. How should the winner be chosen?

Simple, you say. Just use the tried-and-true plurality method: let every voter choose their favorite candidate and let the candidate with the most votes win. This plurality method has the virtue of simplicity, but it suffers from certain well-established weaknesses. The main issue is the Ralph Nader effect. Suppose there are three candidates: the moderate Red candidate (R) gets 48% of the vote, the Blue candidate (B) gets 49% of the vote and the extreme Red candidate (R+) gets 3% of the vote. Under the plurality system, B wins. But, since the R+ voters obviously prefer R to B, the true majority preference (R) is thwarted by the plurality method. (Side comment: there was a lie in the previous sentence. As is clear from a cursory reading of the meshugosphere, R+ voters prefer anybody but R.) Formally, we say that R is a Condorcet winner, since in head-to-head, R would beat each of the other candidates. Thus, the plurality method might not choose a Condorcet winner, which is a bad thing. (A similar thing happens when, instead of one major Red candidate and one minor one, there are two major Red candidates that split the vote.)

Another, closely related, weakness of plurality voting is that voters are forced to vote strategically, rather than sincerely. To use the above example, if your real preference is R+, but you know that voting for R+ might tilt the results from R's favor to B's favor, you're likely to vote for R (your strategic choice), rather than R+ (your sincere choice). This is also a bad thing.

The weakness of plurality voting lies in the fact that voters give very little information. We know their preferred candidate (or at least, their strategic choice), but we don't know what they think about the other candidates. Thus, the fact that R+ voters prefer R to B is never given expression and is not taken into account in computing results.

A wide variety of solutions have been proposed and all involve eliciting more information from the voters. The simplest proposed improvement is approval voting: a voter can vote for all the candidates he approves of. If he has one clear favorite, he can vote just for that candidate. If he doesn't care much about most candidates but really despises one of the candidates, he can vote for all but the one he hates. (This should be immensely popular around these parts.) The candidate with most votes wins.

This method has much to recommend it. First of all, in our above example, R+ voters can simply vote for both R+ and R. This solves both problems mentioned above. First, voters are more likely to vote sincerely, not strategically (they really do prefer both R and R+ to B). Second, R is likely to beat B, thus giving the voters their true choice. In fact, it can be shown that approval voting generally (though, not always, as we'll see) results in victory for Condorcet winners.

But, there are problems. First of all, imagine that there a whole bunch of candidates running and a voter has a clear ranking of the candidates in his head. He still wouldn't quite know where to draw the line: between his most favorite and second favorite? between 5th favorite and 6th favorite?. This mushiness can result in two voters with identical preferences casting vastly differing ballots.

If that doesn't sound especially awful, consider another situation. There are three candidates. Our old friends, R and B, and a third candidate, whom we'll call P for Pareve. Let R be the favorite of 70% of the voters, B the favorite of 30%, and P the favorite of nobody. Now , it is perfectly possible that P is so perfectly inoffensive that 75% of the voters (whether they prefer R or B) also vote for P. Then despite the fact that R is a massive Condorcet winner and P is nobody's preference, P would win the election.

Well, if approval voting addresses the problems with plurality voting by eliciting more information from the voter, we can try to solve the problems with approval voting by eliciting even more information. Specifically, we can ask a voter to rank the candidates in order of preference -- most favorite, 2nd favorite, and so on. This, of course, tells us a lot more about a voter's preferences than just approve/don't approve. Of course, once we know every voter's preferences, it isn't exactly obvious how we ought to determine the winner. We need to define some appropriate aggregation function that takes all the votes and computes the winner.

Now, it's important to know that there's no perfect aggregation function. This follows from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which argues that some really simple set of properties (that you surely would hope for an aggregation function to have) are not simultaneously satisfied by any aggregation function. Nevertheless, there are some reasonable aggregation functions. The most famous of them is the Borda count, more familiar to Americans as MVP voting (sort of). If there are ten candidates, then a candidate gets 10 points for each first-place vote, 9 for each second-place vote, and so on down the line.

The extra information provided by ranking does indeed come in handy. Thus, in our example with the pareve candidate, P might indeed get lots of second-place votes, but R would still win, since second-place votes are worth less than first-place votes.

And yet, no surprise, there are problems with this too. First, it's really asking too much off voters to have them rank a whole gaggle of candidates. Second, it seems that using Borda count, Condorcet winners are actually less likely to win than they are using approval voting. Moreover, Borda count invites strategic voting. For example, suppose there are two real candidates, R and B, and eight bogus parties, which we'll call Pensioners1, Pensioners2, etc. Let's assume that nobody really wants to see any of the Pensioners candidates anywhere near the victory stand. Nevertheless, it's pretty clear what voters will do. (You know what you would do.) The R voters would bury the B candidate behind all the Pensioners candidates and the B voters would return the favor. One of those Pensioners candidates could even win as a result, to everybody's horror.

Of course, there are those who propose to remedy these flaws by asking voters to provide even more information. This can be done by having voters assign a grade, say from 0 to 100, to each candidate. This is clearly more general than ranking, since it imposes an implicit ranking and even facilitates indicating by how much, say, one's 4th favorite candidate is preferred over one's 5th favorite. This is a new idea and the literature on it is still a bit raw.

I personally think the simplest thing would be to use approval voting but limiting a voter to at most two approved candidates. The reasons I prefer this will have to wait for another occasion.

One of the main arguments put forward by R. Avraham Sherman against R. Druckman's conversions is that R. Druckman signed on conversions at which he was not present. This was a technical matter since it is not disputed that three dayanim were present at each of those conversions.

As they say: kol haposel bemumo posel. I am holding in my hand a document written by the Commissioner of Complaints against Judges, Tova Strassberg-Cohen, and signed by her on March 31, 2008. The document is a response to a complaint against a panel of dayanim sitting on a case involving a divorce dispute.

The whole panel seems to have been out of control: they heard testimony in the presence of only one side, neglected to keep protocols, and so on. But the main complaints involve the aforementioned R. Sherman (RAS).

First of all, RAS failed to disclose that one of the lawyers appearing before him was at the same time representing his daughter in front of another court. When this was discovered, he was asked by Rav Amar to cease hearing the case. RAS simply ignored Rav Amar's request.

Second, RAS signed the ruling despite not attending a session of the court at which testimony was heard.

You can't make this stuff up.

Today I'll follow up on my previous post about election systems. The upshot of the last post was that switching to a (partial) first-past-the-post (FPTP) regional voting method will result in two major parties (and possibly one or two minor parties with regional appeal).

In this post, I'll explain the overall advantages and disadvantages of such a system as compared to the current proportional system.

In an excellent article in Azure, Amotz Asa-el outlines the failures of Israel's proportional representation system. He identifies the crucial issues as:
1. A plethora of small parties representing special interests. Since such parties are necessary for forming coalitions, they have power that is incommensurate both with their limited size and with their limited sense of national responsibility.
2. Greater accountability of MKs to their parties than to their constituents. This leads to all manner of irresponsible and even corrupt behavior, as predicted in a brilliant paper by Ferdinand Hermens, cited at length by Asa-el.

So will FPTP solve these problems?

With regard to the first issue, as discussed in my previous post, there is no doubt that most small parties will be eliminated. But then there are two possibilities. The less likely one is that neither major party will have an absolute majority and will need to form a coalition with some minor regional party. In this case, the problem of disproportional power is not diminished but rather greatly exacerbated, since the minor partner is likely to be the sole coalition option and hence will have the same voting power as the major partner. The more likely possibility is that one party will have an absolute majority. This is a scary proposition, unless Israel's major political parties become significantly more responsible than they are now.

Which leads to the question of accountability to the voters as opposed to party interests. Clearly the need for MKs to please the voters leads inevitably to a weakening of the parties. Just as clearly, as voters abandon small parties in regions where those parties have no chance, the larger parties will be incentivized to run candidates in those regions who are attractive to the floating voters. In the long run, this will lead to great improvements. Unfortunately, it will take a fair amount of time until 1) voters learn to abandon parties with no chance and 2) parties learn to run attractive candidates rather than ones that are loyal to the party line. Until that happens, matters will be worse rather than better.

As a result, we are better off if, during a transition period, we adopt a system that combines direct election of MKs with proportional results (and I don't mean half this and half that). There are a number of ways to do this. One is to use single transferable vote, in which elections are regional but more than one candidate is elected in each region in such manner that each party receives a number of seats proportional to the number of overall votes it received. The other is to use a system as in Belgium in which elections are national and proportional, as they are now, but in which a voter specifies preferred candidates within the party he has selected.

Both these systems encourage personal accountability while preserving proportionality. Once Israel's parties have learned the principle of accountability, we can take the next step and move to ordinary regional elections. Once we do, I hope we use something a bit more sophisticated than FPTP. As I did in my previous post, I once again promise to explain the alternatives in my next post.

Most Americans in Israel are in favor of personal elections for the Knesset. It's what we are used to and, having experienced both proportional and direct elections, we know that directly elected politicians tend to be more responsive to their constituents. But a sober evaluation of the alternatives suggests that the issue is not as clear-cut as some think.

Consider, for example, the election reform bill recently proposed by four MKs from across a spectrum of political parties. Briefly, the idea is that only 60 of 120 MKs would be elected in the proportional method currently used; the other 60 will be elected one each from 60 regions in first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections. (FPTP means simply that each voter chooses one candidate and the one with most votes wins -- the method we are used to.) In other words, each voter has two ballots: one is for voting for a regional candidate affiliated with one of the parties and the other is for voting for a party.

Sounds pretty innocent. Sort of half-way between the current proportional method and the American method of voting for congressmen. What could be bad? But you might have second thoughts if you look at the results of a simple simulation done by my friend Avram D. Avram computed what the distribution of Knesset seats would have been in the 2003 and 2006 elections had the proposed new method been used instead of the old one. (He assumed that every voter would have simply used both ballots to vote for the same party; experience in other countries with similar methods suggests that this is a plausible assumption -- but see caveats below.)

Here is what would have happened (actual results are in parentheses):
In 2003, Likud (38) would have gotten 87 seats. Shinui (15), Shas (11), Ichud Leumi (7), Mafdal (6), Meretz (6) all would have been wiped off the map. In 2006, Kadima (29) would have gotten 58 seats and the Likud would have been wiped off the map.

How does the thought of Sharon with 87 seats grab your fancy? Or Olmert with 58?

The reason this happens is plain to see. A party that has a slight edge in each region gets all the regional seats in a disproportional manner. (In the case of the particular method proposed here, the problem is exacerbated by a stipulation that a party that doesn't win any regions is disqualified from getting any seats in the proportional part as well.)

It should be noted that what will really happen if the proposed method were adopted is a bit different than these numbers suggest. According to a straightforward principle known as Duverger's law, FPTP elections inevitably result in a two party system, or at the very least each region becomes a two-party race, because voters will simply stop voting (in the regionals) for any party that has no chance of winning. So it is likely that some of the votes that went to small parties in the regions where they lost badly would actually go to a larger party such as Likud.

While I understand perfectly well the huge advantage in terms of accountability conferred by direct elections, I am scared to death of the thought of any party having 87 seats. I think a plethora of parties is a blessing not a curse; it makes compromise both necessary and possible. (The more parties the more potential coalitions.) To be sure, I think datiim would be better served by having clout in the major parties than by being represented by ineffective politruks (same for Arabs, Russians, etc.), but even so I'm not ready to contemplate a two-party system here quite yet.

One very partial remedy would be for the regional elections to use some system other than FPTP. There are many such systems, each with advantages and disadvantages. In my next post, I'll give an overview.

If you want to get some idea of the standards maintained by Israel's newspaper of record, Haaretz, have a look at this piece. Not recommended after meals.

Let's summarize the basic facts and relevant legal issues in the latest Olmert affair.

At about 11:00 PM (Israel time), the police and the Justice Ministry issued a statement. (As always, read the original.) It's mostly technical stuff about the gag order but the key paragraph is this:

החקירה עוסקת בחשד לקבלת כספים שלא כדין, על-ידי מר אולמרט, במסגרת כהונתו הציבורית כשר התמ"ת וכראש עיריית ירושלים. על-פי החשד, התקבלו על-ידי מר אולמרט כספים בסכומים משמעותיים, מגורם או מגורמי חוץ, לאורך תקופה ממושכת, חלקם במישרין וחלקם בעקיפין

Briefly, Olmert is suspected of accepting money illegally from foreign sources over a long period of time. The word "bribes" is not used but the media have been using the word freely. Uri HaCohen Aharonov of Channel 1 claims that a senior police source told him explicitly that Olmert accepted envelopes filled with cash.

The police have gotten testimony from at least four sources. One is Moshe Talansky of Woodmere, who raised money on behalf of Olmert and many other organizations. Another is Olmert's trusted assistant of thirty years, Shula Zaken, who, unfortunately for Olmert, is known for keeping meticulous records. A third is Olmert's old law partner, with whom he has had an ongoing shady relationship and who is involved in all the open police files on Olmert, Uri Messer. The fourth is an unnamed senior politician associated with Kadima ("Deep Throat"), variously rumored to be Avraham Hirschson (because he has good reason to sing) or Shimon Peres (because you can't have a conspiracy without him). In addition, a number of Haredi makhers, who "did business" with Olmert have been questioned.

In his carefully prepared statement tonight, Olmert said a number of important things:

1. He admitted that he received money from Talansky but claimed they were campaign contributions. Olmert agrees that Talansky was passing on funds from others. (A key question is the identities of the donors and what interests they may have had.) Note carefully that he said that he didn't accept bribes and he didn't put money in his pocket. He did not say that he didn't break the law. He couldn't say this because, even if his story is true, he violated any number of campaign funding laws.

2. He said that the technical matters involving the campaign funds were dealt with by Uri Messer. In short, he threw his old friend Messer to the wolves. I can only assume that Messer has already done the same or will shortly. There is the matter of privileged information here, since presumably Olmert can argue that Messer was acting as his attorney.

3. Olmert admitted to receiving money from Talansky even after the last campaign in which Talansky was involved (Olmert's run for leadership of Likud against Sharon in 2002). Olmert's spin was that this was to pay off debts incurred in the campaign. Note that the older bribery investigations against Olmert revolve around payments made in 2003 and 2004, so the chronology is beginning to make more sense.

4. Olmert said that if indicted, he will resign. Note that he did not say he would suspend himself temporarily. This has crucial political consequences, as I'll explain.

To put matters simply, since Olmert all but admitted to violating campaign funding laws (and since just about everybody understands he's guilty of much worse than that), he is toast.

Legally, how does this play out?

According to Basic Law: The Government, a Minister or Deputy Minister, other than the Prime Minister, must resign if he has been convicted of a crime with turpitude and has exhausted all appeals. In the case of Deputy Minister Rafael Pinchasi of Shas, the Court ruled that he could not continue to serve as a Deputy Minister after he was indicted and before he even stood trial. Since the law quite explicitly says one thing and the court said another (this possibility is a special feature of the Israeli legal system), it is hard to know what is actually supposed to happen in future cases.

In any case, with regard to the Prime Minister, the law is that even a final conviction with turpitude is insufficient to force resignation; the Knesset then needs to vote no confidence in the Prime Minister. This is to preserve separation of powers; ultimately only the Knesset can bring down a Prime Minister, not the courts. Thus the Pinchasi ruling is inapplicable here (despite the unfounded contrary claim on Channel 1 tonight by a certain clueless law school dean, who makes a habit of sucking up to the Court). In short, if Olmert is brought down by the Attorney General or by the Court, it would be a tragedy; if the Court properly keeps its nose out of this and the Knesset fails to bring him down, it would be a farce.

So what are the possible scenarios?

1. Olmert declares -- or the Attorney General rules -- that Olmert is temporarily incapacitated ("nivtzarut zmanit"). Then the official substitute Prime Minister, Tzippi Livni, takes over automatically for a period of up to 100 days. Once 100 days have passed, it is as if the Prime Minister has resigned.

2. Olmert resigns or is incapacitated for 100 days. Then the President offers the Knesset Member most likely to be able to form a coalition of 61 MKs the opportunity to do so. If he or she fails to do so, and an alternate candidate also fails, we go to elections.

3. The Knesset disperses itself. Then elections are held within 90 days.

Note the crucial distinction between the PM suspending himself or being ruled temporarily incapacitated and the PM resigning. In the first case, Livni gets a free 100 days to establish herself as PM before having to either pull together a coalition or face elections. In the latter case, she doesn't get the 100 days. So Olmert's promise that he'd resign following an indictment has some significance.

The next big explosion will be when the identity of Deep Throat is revealed.