Awright, awright, I know it's been a while since I promised an official report on civil rights violations in the withdrawal affair. The legal eagles are still dotting and crossing and all that stuff so bear with me.

The main damage has already been done: 10,000 people are out on the street. Now it's time for a realistic assessment of the consequences for Israel's security and its social cohesiveness, respectively.

The main elements of security (at least in Israel's case) are defensible borders, preparedness of the defense forces, deterrence and effective alliances. The second of these is closely tied in to the question of social cohesiveness, so I'll leave it for that discussion.

The definition of defensible borders is not clear cut: it involves topographic considerations (controlling the high ground) and demographic considerations (keeping hostile populations out), in addition to the obvious desiderata of maximizing controlled area for maneuverability while minimizing the length of vulnerable borders. It should be borne in mind that in determining optimal borders considerations other than defense are also relevant: the empty country is perfectly defensible but probably not what you're after.

The main claimed advantage of the reshaping of the borders to exclude Azza are the exclusion of approximately one million Arabs from areas nominally under Israeli control and the shortening of defense lines. The hallucinatory left (which now includes Ehud Olmert, who is making his case for Shinui voters since he knows he's dead in Likud) also believes that Israel's deterrence is enhanced as a result of the reduction in Arab hostility that the withdrawal will bring. In addition, the mere fact of Israel's having made concessions is claimed to have strengthened the quality of its alliances.

The reality is, unfortunately, somewhat different. It is true that defense lines have been shortened, mostly as a result of withdrawing civilians from Netzarim, Kfar Darom and Morag, which were inconveniently situated. Gush Katif could have been secured at little cost in terms of defense lines, if the refugee camp in Rafiach had been properly dealt with. The Arabs in Azza have not been under Israeli civilian control for ten years and they will remain under Israeli military control as soon as the IDF is forced to return there to control rocket fire.

With regard to deterrence, well, no country has ever improved its deterrence capability by withdrawing under fire and permitting unfettered importation of artillery into an area from which it is already being attacked. And as for diplomacy, by withdrawing right back to the '67 borders (including withdrawal from Elei Sinai which clearly results in less defensible borders), Israel is merely inviting pressure for its withdrawal to the '67 borders in Yehuda and Shomron as well. And this is the nub of the problem because those borders are certainly not defensible.

So what is to be done? First, to restore its deterrence, Israel must respond to artillery fire from Azza by -- let's not bother phrasing this too diplomatically -- bombing the shit out of them. We do now have the advantage of there being no Israelis there to suffer from the fallout. And artillery fire from another country -- which Azza now effectively is -- certainly constitutes causus belli. Second, to prevent the extension of the withdrawal principle to Yehuda and Shomron, those areas of Yehuda and Shomron that lie within whatever borders are deemed defensible must be physically secured and possibly annexed. (Annexation is just a paper event and is less important.) Third, the precedent of removing inconveniently situated communities in the context of political realignment of borders must be presented in a manner that is sufficiently broad to include eventual application to the Arab populations in those areas. (This last sentence has been REVISED in response to the cogent comments of kaspit and zalman.)

Two final comments:

In case, you're thinking that Sharon is in fact doing exactly what I'm claiming should be done, think again. There is a simple test: choose a parcel of land that everyone agrees is critical for Israel's security but has not yet been physically secured and that the rest of the world wishes to see Israel relinquish. Let's see if Sharon does what needs to be done or backs down to pressure. Well, there is such a parcel of land -- called E1 -- that connects Jerusalem to Maaleh Adumim and here is how Sharon is dealing with it. Neither Bush's phantom promise nor the supposed goodwill generated by the withdrawal have bought us the tiniest advantage in this respect.

Finally, if you supported the withdrawal from Azza but find my third point above (about expelling Arabs) morally repulsive (as opposed to just difficult), you might be part of the problem. I hope to post on this next as part of a discussion of the effects of withdrawal on Israeli society.